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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the policy implications of the pooling and sharing of forces and 
weapons as a feasible way to strengthen European military power in an era of scarcity. 
This thesis argues that pooling and sharing is likely to be successful only if states enhance 
their emphasis on collective defense by mutual aid and self help and reduce particularist 
and parochial interests of local gain. Pooling and sharing could improve European 
military capabilities significantly and for the long term if differences in location factors 
are taken into account and all states concentrate on their respective strengths. Pooling of 
money in the form of common funding can set incentives, and is easier than pooling of 
established military structures. The analysis of NATO’s experiences proves that pooling 
and sharing is a painstaking process that has to be organized in a way that accounts for 
national specifics. More competition and less concentration are the key to ensuring 
guaranteed access to military assets. The behavior of the United States and its bilateral 
relationship to European states has an important influence on pooling and sharing in 
Europe. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis investigates the extent to which pooling and sharing of military forces and 
weapons represents a feasible approach to improving European military forces in times of 
economic scarcity. 
While pooling means the merging of capabilities, whereby the national power of 
disposition stays national and all member states still have access to their own assets, 
sharing means the eschewal of one’s own national capabilities and is possible in two 
ways: the building of common, multinational capabilities, or reliance on the capabilities 
of other nations.  
Security, national sovereignty, and resource efficiency are three factors that 
countries can each choose to emphasize differently. Most—if not all—European states 
are emphasizing national sovereignty and resource efficiency, with the typical effect of 
small quantities, unilateral cuts, and/or free-riding in relying on the United States to 
provide security1. A greater European emphasis on security instead of national 
sovereignty can lead to more defense cooperation, and pooling and sharing are suitable 
means to achieving this stronger cooperation. To what extent will national sovereignty 
suffer from pooling and sharing? The sovereignty of European nations in security affairs 
is already limited. However, the nations are likely to pursue pooling and sharing only 
when their security is thereby enhanced and their sovereignty is not additionally confined. 
It is not the right way if sovereignty is understood in a way that every state has to have its 
own capabilities. The decisive point for sovereignty is not that every nation relies on its 
own (limited) capabilities but that there be alternatives and competition between force 
providers. Some other national dependencies—for example, on oil and other natural 
resources—can influence a state much more. Thus, the influence of pooling and sharing 
on national autonomy should be kept in mind but not overestimated. National strength 
and national vulnerability is based on many factors. National autarchy is not an 
                                                 
1The American emphasis lies on security and national sovereignty, in conjunction with high defense 
spending and unilateral behavior. One may hypothesize that there will be a future shift to more resource 
efficiency at the expense of national sovereignty and, perhaps, some lower demands in marginal areas of 
security. 
 xvi 
alternative, because it cannot assure access to the growing global pool of technological 
and management skills, and is therefore at least as dangerous. 
Pooling and sharing are not able to compensate completely for Europe’s low 
defense spending, but they are able to improve Europe’s military strength if implemented 
in the right way. Times of austerity combined with an allegedly low threat level are not 
best suited to encourage multinational military cooperation. In times of austerity, pooling 
and sharing will only improve military means when military cooperation is implemented 
comprehensively and controlled, not anywhere and accidently. Therefore, Europe needs a 
target-actual-comparison of military capabilities that reveals a need for changes. 
Redundant capabilities should be deleted in those countries where they incur the highest 
costs. Sparse capabilities should be implemented as common-shared capabilities or role-
shared capabilities in countries with the best location factors. National differences, low 
trust, and the dominance of the United States can be stumbling blocks for further military 
cooperation in Europe, while institutions, and especially their common funding, are 
capable of promoting pooling and sharing.  
Only a handful of the twenty-seven European Union (EU) nations spend around 
three quarters of the EU defense budget. The behavior of these states is decisive. More 
than half of the twenty-seven states contribute less than one percent of the EU overall 
defense budget. These states’ engagement in pooling and sharing cannot widely affect 
European military capabilities. 
The biggest part of the military budget is for personnel, and there are big 
differences among costs per soldier in the EU. Low costs for personnel are good location 
factors for realms that are personnel intensive. Such differences can be used in a long-
term view. NATO’s experiences, such as with AWACS, show that pooling and sharing 
are the right way to go. However, patience and endurance are needed to implement really 
multinational solutions. Overall, it is often much easier and cheaper to pool money for 
common funding than to pool the real capabilities of different nations. 
 xvii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First of all, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the German Armed Forces, 
which gave me the outstanding and tremendously appreciated opportunity to study at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. I’m indebted to Colonel Dirk Rogalski, who 
encouraged me to concentrate my efforts on this topic and to Dr. Carolyn Halladay and 
Professor Donald Abenheim. I always enjoyed their teaching and took their well-regarded 
suggestions and comments to heart. The Naval Postgraduate School and its professorate 
provided an excellent research environment for studying. I express my sincere gratuity to 
Greta Marlatt from the Dudley Knox library, who dedicated much personal time to 
supporting my research and often acted as “first serious reader” of my drafts. 
I thank my family, my wife, Andrea, and my two daughters, Nadja and Vanessa, 
who for years have had to bear a big part of my job-related burdens and accept many 
hours of husband’s and daddy’s absence. 
Finally, I express my sincere thanks to all people, who, in their private or 
professional capacity, taught me and inspired me in thinking outside the box. As Guy de 
Maupassant expresses it rightly, “It is the lives we encounter that make life worth living.” 
That’s especially true while studying at the Naval Postgraduate School. The multinational 
esprit and the multifaceted experiences of the students create a unique environment. 
 xviii 




This thesis investigates the extent to which the pooling and sharing of military, 
forces, weapons and other assets represents a feasible approach to improving European 
military forces in times of economic scarcity in the present and future.  
Pooling and sharing are special forms of cooperation, particularly in large 
organizations and the armed forces. “Pooling” means the merging of capabilities, 
whereby the national power of disposition stays national. Pooled assets are no longer 
separate, but separable. “Sharing” means the eschewal of one’s own national capabilities 
and is possible in two ways: either the building of common, multinational capabilities 
that are inseparable, or the use of capabilities of other nations that are willing to provide 
capabilities for others in a specialized role or as a lead nation for special tasks. Following 
these definitions, pooling signifies that all member states still have access to their own 
assets, which is not the case with sharing. Pooling and sharing can occur together.2 
The question of pooling and sharing has been an issue in the European Union 
since the birth of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), if not since the 
foundation of NATO at the end of the 1940s.3 This policy was further developed and 
implemented in various steps and renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) in December 2009.  
In the light of the financial crisis that began in 2008 and the resulting fiscal 
austerity measures in many member states of the European Union, as well as in the 
                                                 
2The European Air Transport Command (EATC) and the multinational procurement of three C-17 
cargo aircraft are typical examples of common and shared capability. Most of the national air transport 
aircraft assigned to the EATC and pooled in Eindhoven are still separable and have caveats ensuring 
national use if needed. 
3Pooling of resources in Europe was a topic since the very first beginning of the European integration 
movement after World War II. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in 1952 by a 
treaty among France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux States aimed at pooling coal and steel resources 
under a High Authority. “This choice was not only economic but also political, as these two raw materials 
were the basis of the industry and power of the two countries. The underlying political objective was to 
strengthen Franco-German solidarity, banish the spectre of war and open the way to European integration.” 
See European Union, Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC Treaty, in 
Europe Summaries of EU legislation, last updated, October 15, 2010, http://europa.eu/legislation_-
summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_ecsc_en.htm, accessed 11/19/2011. 
 2 
United States, barring a major new crisis of war, further increases of national defense 
budgets so that individual states may acquire expensive military capabilities seems to be 
improbable. On the basis of well-developed alliance and cooperative structures (NATO, 
EU, etc.), Europe has lately embraced, once more, the idea of pooling and sharing 
military assets and capabilities. 
The feasibility of pooling and sharing in general depends on a number of issues 
that are closely related to the research question: 
• What are the politics and economics of defense pooling and sharing at the 
national level, as well as in the European context? 
• Does pooling and sharing limit EU member states’ sovereignty, and, if so, 
are EU member states prepared to cede some sovereignty in the area of 
security and defense? 
• How can pooling and sharing address the major shortcomings and 
redundancies in capabilities? 
• Are European military expenditures able to generate capabilities that are 
sufficient for European purposes? 
• How divergent or convergent are the national security interests and 
national security cultures of the European states that would participate in a 
pooling or sharing arrangement, and are there reasons for distrust among 
the nations when it comes to security and defense?  
• Which roles play institutions such as the EU and NATO for pooling and 
sharing, and what precedents may serve as a guide to policy?  
• What role and influence has the United States in the pooling and sharing 
of Europe’s military capabilities? 
This analysis does not anticipate a detailed analysis of European military 
capabilities, as it would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
A. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The first part after the introduction will apply general theories, politics, and 
economics on pooling and sharing. As a first step, this thesis addresses the 
interdependence of national security, sovereignty, and resource efficiency, using a model 
called the “defense interest trilemma.” One center of gravity is the research on how far 
national sovereignty is affected by pooling and sharing. 
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In the next chapter, the thesis provides a model of how capability gaps and 
redundancies in capabilities can be addressed with pooling and sharing. The third chapter 
tries to answer how far pooling and sharing is capable of dealing with the current level of 
European military expenditures. Based on these findings, the fourth researches national 
differences and specifics and the behavior towards cooperation, primarily focused on the 
four big EU member states. The fifth chapter examines the roles of EU and NATO for 
pooling and sharing in Europe. Thereby Thereafter, NATO’s experiences with pooling 
and sharing—aside from common-funding mechanisms—are the main focus of analysis. 
The last chapter deals with the role and influence of the United States in pooling and 
sharing Europe’s capabilities. 
All findings are brought together in the conclusion, which answers the question of 
whether and how far pooling and sharing may be able to improve European military 
forces in times of economic scarcity. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The member states of the European Union together undertake the world’s second 
largest defense outlays, after the USA. Nonetheless, the results of this spending, in the 
form of deployable military forces, satisfies neither the European member states nor their 
close Atlantic ally, the United States—though for different political and strategic reasons 
that cannot be fully explored within the limits of this thesis. Even before the Euro crisis 
of 2009 and in the aftermath, EU member states have viewed their defense spending as 
more than enough granted their own policies.  
More than twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the NATO-European states 
rely to some lesser or greater degree on their transatlantic partner when it comes to 
security and military crisis management. Then in the early 1990s, the crises in ex-
Yugoslavia showed that—even if the political will was there—a solitary European 
military intervention would not be effective. The Libyan intervention in 2011 further 
suggested that European military forces and arms, of their own, were still insufficient, 
even for a temporary, limited engagement in such a crisis. While a major external threat 
to the EU member states, as in the era of total war, is not likely to menace EU territory 
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directly, security and violent crises in the EU’s sphere of interest are still likely to 
happen, and the European Union must be capable of dealing with such crises, even if the 
Americans choose not to become involved.  
In the future, Europe would not be well advised to rely solely or permanently on 
U.S. military forces. Reductions in projected U.S. military spending are foreseeable in the 
year 2012, and the U.S. strategic focus has shifted to the Middle East and Asia. The U.S. 
security guarantees—particularly when it comes to regional crises—are not as 
forthcoming as in the era 1949–1999. On the other hand, the United States for decades 
has demanded larger European contributions to security and defense as part of the 
dynamics of burden sharing that are central to the Atlantic Alliance4. Europe now has to 
take the policy implications of this decades-old burden-sharing debate more seriously if it 
seeks regional security and aspires to become a global security provider. 
The decline of defense budgets across the European Union and the ongoing 
austerity measures to counter the post-2008 financial crisis make it unrealistic to expect 
improvements in European military capabilities by increased defense spending. 
Therefore, it is imperative that European governments use their scarce money efficiently. 
There are many redundancies in military capabilities and the overall personnel 
strength of two million soldiers in the European Union as a whole cries for improvement, 
because only a small fraction of this total force can deploy to an actual operation. 
Additional, only an eighth of research and technology money is used for common 
 
 
                                                 
4The Allied quest for a better burden-sharing balance and greater European military capabilities has 
been present since NATO was established in 1949. However, during the Cold War, the Soviet threat united 
Western powers and also concentrated defense efforts amid some controversy. At the same time, the U.S. 
strategic focus on Europe and the resulting U.S. security guarantees for the European Allies limited the 
incentives for Europeans to invest more in security and defense. Today, of course, the Soviet threat is long 
gone and with it, the immediate cause for transatlantic unity. There is multifaceted literature on burden-
sharing in NATO, e.g., Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO (New 
York, M. E. Sharpe, 2003) or Stanley R. Sloan, Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain 
from Truman to Obama (New York, The Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd, 2010). Following 
article shows that the burden-sharing and burden-shifting debate is a continuum. Ellen Hallams and 
Benjamin Schreer, “Towards a ‘post-American’ alliance? NATO burden-sharing after Libya,” International 
Affairs (March 2012, vol. 88, iss. 2), 313–327.  
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research programs. The twenty-seven member states field twenty-five armies, twenty-one 
air forces and eighteen navies,5 nearly all of them with different weapons systems and 
without coordination in force planning. 
The importance of this thesis, which will analyze the feasibility of pooling and 
sharing military capabilities among the EU member nations for an effective and efficient 
future force, flows logically from this argument. Pooling and sharing might become the 
nucleus of a truly integrated European common security and defense policy and for a 
European Union that can fulfill its security responsibilities on the global stage.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis proposes that all states must find the right mixture of the three 
irreconcilable interests of national security, sovereignty, and resource efficiency. 
Therefore, two hypotheses will guide this research: First, as has been the case since 1945, 
no European nation is able to ensure its security alone. This assertion implies that 
member states’ capacity for sovereignty is already limited in the realm of war and peace 
and the employment of armed force for policy ends. Therefore, a further emphasis on 
national sovereignty leads in the wrong direction. 
While the European Union, as a supranational organization, ties its member states 
closely in many policy areas, security and defense policy remains an intergovernmental 
issue, and the European Union cannot force its member states to cooperate in the policy 
area of security and defense. While the relative power of the European Union in security 
and defense has grown since 1998, it is still very limited. In principle, national security 
remains the sole responsibility of each member state, and the states retain the ultimate 
decision-making authority and veto powers. The European Union coordinates member-
state policies or implements supplemental common policies as long as they are not 
covered elsewhere. Following this principle of subsidiarity, the European Union performs 
its common security policy only in areas that cannot be managed more effectively on 
lower levels. In other words, member states are sovereign in decisions concerning their 
                                                 
5Jolyon Howorth. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 253. 
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military forces, and the European Union has no legal instruments to enforce security-
related decisions that would limit national sovereignty. At the same time, however, no 
single European nation is able to deal with emerging security challenges and threats 
alone. Moreover, a decision-making process based on unanimity might paralyze the 
ability of the European military to develop capabilities. Various national interests and 
national particularities are not likely to be unified perfectly in the foreseeable future.  
Second, pooling and sharing is able to improve European military capabilities 
significantly and over the long term at least as long as the bigger European states 
participate. Really broad improvements are only possible when institutions set incentives, 
such as common funding, and economical location factors are used as primary guidelines 
for implementing lacking capabilities. Otherwise, scarce defense budgets will not allow 
perceptible improvements, and pooling and sharing solutions will mainly be used to 
reduce costs, without necessarily improving the strategic and operational effectiveness of 
the forces involved. This latter point is especially true in light of the financial crisis and 
the resulting austerity in most EU member states. 
Military cooperation among twenty-six sovereign states6 with different interests, 
to say nothing of divergent sizes and strengths, is not a surefire success. Many cost-
saving measures are pursued on the national level. For example, the structural changes 
implemented in the German and British military forces in 2010 and 2011 do not reflect 
European coordination or cooperation. Both states will considerably reduce the size of 
their armed forces, but both intend to maintain the full range of national capabilities. 
Great Britain’s thinking seems to be very Euro-critical but even in Germany—calling for 
a stronger Europe all the time (including further coordination with the European Union or 
other European countries on military issues)—the most recent cuts did not unfold under 
close coordination with an allied or EU framework.  
Pooling and sharing signify a process of cooperation and concentration that can 
happen in such different areas as material, personnel, infrastructure, and services. 
Military capabilities must work reliably and in an orderly fashion. Best practices include 
                                                 
6Denmark does not take part in the Common Security and Defence Policy. 
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regulations that are not too complex. Different languages, complicated work-sharing 
contracts, dependencies and national caveats may complicate the system more than 
helping strengthen capabilities. Pooling and sharing may be cost efficient, but they can 
also increase mutual dependence. Connected with decision-making processes that 
demand unanimity, dependencies that paralyze the system are likely to occur when single 
states are able to monopolize or control key capabilities. Therefore, pooling and sharing 
will mostly happen in subsidiary areas like education and training.  
Trust in partner nations is considered to be the glue of all common improvements. 
Currently some European states, such as the UK, seem to trust more in a strong U.S. ally 
than in each other. This reality must figure in all planning and policy if the European 
Union is to surmount obstacles and harness incentives to strengthen European 
capabilities. Capabilities will only be improved when integrated European military 
capabilities are stronger than the separate national capacities had been before.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The pooling and sharing of defense and military forces in political and strategic 
cooperation are not political or military issues that have received special, comprehensive 
scholarly treatment or analysis by policymakers. Nevertheless, the literature in social 
science offers basic explanations about cooperation in general. 
Wallace J. Thies7 analyzed the likelihood of cooperation in relationship of threats 
and resources, with the result that cooperation was found to be unlikely in times of low 
threat and scarce resources. In NATO, attempts to shift the burden are long common 
practice. His findings are as applicable to pooling and sharing as Theodore Moran’s 
findings8 on dependence, security, and efficiency, which play a central role in this thesis. 
According to Moran’s finding, competition in a market is more important than own 
 
                                                 
7Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO (New York, M. E. 
Sharpe, 2003). 256. 
8Theodore H Moran, The Globalization of America’s Defense Industries: Managing the Threat of 
Foreign Dependence International Security (summer 1990, vol. 15, no. 1) 57–99, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538982, accessed 02/06/2012. 
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national capabilities. In the same way, Daniel Drezner’s findings on outsourcing are 
widely applicable to pooling and sharing; through a better allocation of resources all 
participants are better off.9 
Haas describes political integration as a “process whereby political actors in 
several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and 
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction 
over the pre-existing national states.”10 He argues that “satisfaction with the 
organization’s performance would lead to shifting loyalties.”11 In view of the current 
Euro crisis, it is unlikely that satisfaction in the EU is increasing at this time.  
Robert Axelrod’s findings on cooperation are based on a game-theory approach 
and give some interesting insights about cooperation in general. A good way to 
encourage others to cooperate is to make it clear that you will reciprocate. He emphasizes 
that reputation plays a major role, and that it is best for someone who uses the strategy of 
complete cooperation to have everyone knows he is following this strategy. That means 
that pooling and sharing solutions should work best when all nations clearly state their 
intentions with reference to cooperation in an open process. 
In the literature, trust and political will are the conditions most cited as important 
for cooperative solutions such as pooling and sharing. Axelrod’s findings are different: 
He argues with reference to the social structure of cooperation that “the foundation of 
cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of the relationship.”12 The durability of 
the relationship can be assumed inside the European Union and NATO. If his findings are 
adaptable to cooperation in the realm of pooling and sharing, it opens new possibilities to 
                                                 
9Daniel W. Drezner, The Outsourcing Bogeyman Foreign Affairs (May/June 2004, no. 22), 83. 
10Erich B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1958) 16. 
11Erich B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 155. 
12“When the interaction is likely to continue for a long time, and the players care enough about their 
future together, the conditions are ripe for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. … Whether the 
players trust each other or not is less important in the long run than whether the conditions are ripe for them 
to build a stable pattern of cooperation with each other.” Ibid., 132. 
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think about such cooperation. Cooperation, for example, where two partners are mutually 
dependent without any fallback option, can generate trust.13 
Seth G. Jones investigated whether and why European states cooperate in security 
issues in his 2007 book, The Rise of the European Security Cooperation. To answer this 
question, he examined four areas related to security cooperation: European security 
institutions, economic sanctions, arms production, and the military forces. With regard to 
pooling and sharing, especially the latter two are interesting. His finding is that 
cooperation has increased since the end of the Cold War in all these areas. He argues that 
“security cooperation has occurred … largely because of structural changes in the 
international system. The current unipolar system has provided a significant impetus for 
European states to aggregate resources. Security cooperation through the European Union 
decreases the U.S.’s ability to impose its will on the European states.”14 He argues that 
structural conditions, “including concerns about a reunified and powerful Germany 
played the critical role in causing greater European security cooperation. … European 
cooperation is thus a function of relative power.”15 Emphasizing these structural reasons, 
Jones predicts that “a further withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, a strong Germany, 
and a continuation of U.S. global preponderance will lead to greater security cooperation 
among EU states.”16 While “states have traditionally shied away from constructing 
multilateral forces,”17 Jones argues that aggregating military power spread “blood costs” 
but can be problematic if states’ positions about the desired outcome of cooperation 
differ.18 Jones writes: 
States are much stronger when they combine military power than when 
they act unilaterally. Constructing joint military forces merges military 
                                                 
13In this case, cause and effect are changed. While normally mutual trust causes cooperation, 
cooperation without fall back option can also generate trust.  







resources (troops, weapons, technology) and augments their ability to 
project power abroad. Combining power also necessitates maximizing 
efficiency. On the strategic level, military have different grand strategies, 
military doctrines, and force structures. On the operational and tactical 
level, they may have different command, control and communication (C³) 
equipment as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
capacities. Soldiers even speak different languages. Creating multilateral 
forces with an integrated civilian-military organizational structure can help 
overcome these problems by forcing participant states to address their 
differences.19 
NATO has long experience with pooling and sharing, which was enshrined in its 
basic charter as a lesson of allied cooperation in the Second World War. Such capabilities 
as NATO’s Integrated Command Structure and AWACS are common shared assets for 
which plentiful research is available. More recently NATO has started its multinational 
project Alliance Ground Surveillance. Since 2010, NATO has tried, under the slogan of 
“Smart Defence,” to encourage members to cooperate in developing, acquiring, and 
maintaining military capabilities and to provide more security for less money.  
The first broad study on the EU level on pooling and sharing dates from February 
2008 and suggests that “there is far too much duplication of defense effort spread across 
the member states of the EU.”20 It differentiates four types of pooling: 1. sharing of 
capabilities, wherein member states create common capabilities through the provision of 
national capabilities, but without a structure to organize their use; 2. pooling of 
capabilities, in which states retain ownership of their capabilities, which are delegated to 
a common entity while the nation keeps control of their use; 3. pooling through 
acquisition, wherein multinational organizations, rather than states, actually hold the 
assets. (NATO AWACS is such an example); and 4. role sharing, wherein states 
relinquish capabilities on the assumption that another country will make them available 
when necessary.21 These definitions are refined in other research papers, but they will not 
be used in this thesis. According to this study, different nations prefer different solutions. 
                                                 
19Ibid., 28. 
20Jean-Pierre Maulny, Fabio Liberti and Gerrard Quille, “Pooling of EU Member States Assets in the 
Implementation of ESDP,” European Parliamentary Studies (2008): 22. 
21See Ibid., iii. 
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This study argues “that pooling and cooperation can drastically reduce capability gaps, 
thereby reducing the costs of procurement and in-life support”22 of equipment. The study 
notes that pooling solutions are hindered because the defense-planning processes of the 
nations are not harmonized and nomenclature varies. According to this study, providing 
niche capabilities in the form of role sharing could became part of an international 
pooling strategy and enable smaller states to take part “in missions which otherwise have 
been beyond their scope.”23 
This study predicts that lower defense spending, industrial interests and the 
multiplication of transnational companies and cooperative programs will overcome the 
resistance to major capability pooling in the next few years.24 The study also recognizes 
that budgetary aspects of pooling are important. The “ATHENA mechanism,” existing 
since 2004 for common funding of EU operations, covers ten percent of operational costs, 
while ninety percent has to be paid by the nations. This system could be adapted for 
pooling solutions. Another possibility is to increase common funding of research and 
technology. In 2008, only 12.4 percent of national budgets were spent on cooperative 
programs.  
In reference to European capabilities, the literature shows that there are still 
deficits. The scholarly literature and national and EU analyses (and the analyses of 
deployments such as those in the Balkans or in 2011 in Libya) unanimously note that the 
European Union lacks military capabilities for autonomous deployments without the 
United States. Robert Kagan mentions as a result of the inadequate coordination of 
European military capabilities a kind of work-sharing that “consisted in the United States 
‘making the dinner’ and the Europeans ‘doing the dishes.’” 25 Jones argues that 
 
 




25Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York, 
NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 23. 
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“nationalism and a desire to protect state sovereignty and autonomy will prevent EU 
states from attaining the same degree of military cooperation that they have achieved in 
the economic realm.”26 
The EU tries to encourage its participating member states to pool and share, and 
several of its organs are concerned with pooling and sharing. An Initial Long-Term Vision 
for European Defence Capabilities and Capacity Needs, published by the European 
Defence Agency in 2008,27 “calls in question the taxpayer’s willingness to fund ‘defense’ 
if this is seen as wholly concerned with interventions abroad or deterring increasingly 
improbable conventional attacks on European territory.”28 It continues that “attempting 
to harmonize technical requirements is difficult or impossible if the underlying thinking 
on conceptual requirements, and financial and timescale expectations, has not been 
converged from the outset.”29 
In 2010, Germany and Sweden launched a joint pooling and sharing initiative on 
the EU level that was accepted by all participating nations. According to this so-called 
Ghent-Initiative, all EU member states should assess and categorize their military 
capabilities by the criteria of operational effectiveness, economic efficiency, and political 
implications. While such specific capabilities that are considered essential30 will remain 
solely under national responsibility, other capabilities could be pooled or shared by some 
or all member states. Inefficiencies in defense spending would be rectified by this process 
of consolidation. Up to now, the number of truly new proposals has been limited.  
                                                 
26Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 219. 
27The European Union Capability Development Plan from 2008 deals exclusively with multilateral 
opportunities for cooperation in the defense sector but this plan is not free available. 
28European Defence Agency An Initial Long-Term Vision For European Defence Capability and 
Capacity Needs, October 3, 2006, 12, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_-
policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33238_en.htm, accessed 03/15/2012. 
29Ibid., 21. 
30“Combat forces, intelligence, fighter airplanes and war ships could serve as an example within this 
category.” European Union, “Pooling and sharing, German-Swedish initiative,” (Berlin and Stockholm, 
November 2010), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260511-
deseinitiative_/sede260511deseinitiative_en.pdf, accessed 11/10/2011. 
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The high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security, 
Catherine Ashton, wrote on 23 May 2011 that the Council of the European Union “wants 
to turn the financial crisis and its impact on national defence budgets into an opportunity 
for greater cooperation in the area of capability development.”31 The Council sees 
pooling and sharing as a long-term approach and “encourages member states to apply 
pooling and sharing on a systematic and sustainable basis promoting multinational 
cooperation, including on a regional basis, as a key method to preserve and develop 
military capabilities.”32 The European Parliament has launched study papers for pooling 
and sharing.33 In September 2011, the European Defence Agency released a call for 
proposals to conduct research on pooling and sharing and the costs of non-cooperation in 
European defense.34 This research aims to get a clearer picture of pooling and sharing 
options to support the member nations in their decisions. 
On the national level, the recent security and defense white papers or green books 
of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom take clear but different positions. While 
the United Kingdom emphasizes bilateral cooperation, especially with the United States 
and France, the German and French positions are more open to multilateral solutions on 
the European level in accordance with tradition. According to many press articles, the 
                                                 




33In April 2011, for example, the Policy Department of the Directorate-General for External Policies of 
the Union has published a study headlined The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence with a 
country-specific annex.  
34The tender is dated on 21 September 2011 and named Pooling and Sharing - The cost of non-co-
operation in European defence. The aim of the contract is to survey the existing academic and government 
literature, analyzing the costs and benefits of European collaboration highlighting the most effective models 
and most convincing case studies and produce a generic mathematical assessment model to assess the 
benefits and the probability of success of future collaboration particularly with regard to different types of 
pooling and sharing based on concrete success criteria and factors. The study will feed into the Agency’s 
strategic approach on the ‘business case’ for Europe and support the promotion of work on specific future 





2011 Libyan intervention fostered French-British military collaboration, but at the same 
time, Germany’s political behavior of Schaukelpolitik in connection with this 
intervention, once again, was not suited to enhancing military cooperation. Moreover, the 
German parliamentary decision-making process for military deployments is considered 
untrustworthy by certain allies. The meaning of pooling and sharing for the smaller states 
becomes clear, for example, in an interview with the Estonian minster of defense, Mart 
Laar, in the June 2011 issue of Jane’s Defense Weekly. He stated that cooperation is 
particularly important for small countries that cannot independently develop a full range 
of capabilities. He cites as the noteworthy example NATO’s Baltic air policing mission. 
It would be disproportionate for the Baltic States to develop their own fighter capability. 
It is better to spend these states’ money in other niches.35 
Leading research institutes involved with defense issues in Europe have published 
one or more research papers on pooling and sharing, often connected to the ongoing 
austerity measures.36 Jolyon Howorth asks a decisive question: “How can a given nation-
state be persuaded to concentrate its limited efforts on a narrow sector of the overall 
security project—say, the development of air-to-air refueling—while leaving the air 
defence of its territorial space to the specialized air-force of another member state?”37 
Biscop and Coelmont fear that after an initial enthusiasm, conservatism might yet 
gain the upper hand. Going for pooling and sharing only in some peripheral areas will not 
change the face of European defense.38 If states do only pool and share what they already 
have, this does this does not lead to a solution of capability shortfalls. Pooling and 
sharing has to be a long-term platform to launch new capability initiatives. They suggest 
the establishment of a permanent platform in the form of a “capability-generation 
                                                 
35Bruce Jones, “Interview: Mart Laar, Estonia’s Minister of Defence,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 
(London, June 30, 2011).  
36For example the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) or the Swedish 
Defence and Research Agency (FOI) published research papers and studies. 
37Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 253. 
38Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, “Security Policy Brief Pooling & Sharing: From Slow March to Quick 
March?” (May 2011, no. 23), http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/11/sec-gov/SPB23-BiscopCoelmont-
.pdf, accessed 11/20/2011. 
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conference” comparable to existing “force-generation conferences.” A bird’s eye view of 
all member state plans and intentions would permit an assessment of the relevance of 
national capabilities. That would help the nations focus on required capabilities, disinvest 
in overcapacities, and identify pooling and sharing possibilities. Financial margins allow 
the launching of multinational programs. They suggest using the EU mechanism of 
“permanent structured cooperation” because it allows single states to decline to 
participate if they wish.  
Relatively skeptical, but explicitly elaborated, is Tomas Valasek’s article, 
“Surviving Austerity.”39 He argues that deep cooperation remains highly sensitive: 
governments are reluctant to build joint units because this would require them to share 
decisions on how and when to use them. “Some cooperative projects have produced too 
little savings and the appetite for pooling and sharing has waned.”40 According to his 
findings, military integration works best when participating countries have similar 
strategic cultures, a high level of mutual trust, comparable attitudes towards the defense 
industry, and relatively low corruption in defense procurement. For pooling and sharing, 
many of these factors have to align. Therefore, “future defense integration will remain an 
exception rather than the rule.”41 In his view, the idea that EU defense could begin 
around a single core group and spread out with a “snowball-effect” is unrealistic, because 
of different threat perceptions, political interests, and military cultures. Pooling and 
sharing will never compensate for inadequate defense budgets. The EU member states 
“will almost certainly do ‘less with less’ rather than ‘more with less.’”42 
Data about defense spending, military structure, and cooperative projects are 
available in secondary sources like the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
                                                 
39Tomas Valasek, “Surviving Austerity: The Case for a New Approach to EU Military 
Collaboration,” (London: Centre for European Reform, 2011). 




(SIPRI)43 or the yearly “Military Balances”44 of the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS). Some institutions, such as NATO45 and the European Union46 also 
regularly collect, analyze, and evaluate the defense spending of their member states. U.S. 
defense spending is the most frequently used benchmark for EU defense spending as a 
whole.47 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Pooling and sharing are special forms of cooperation that have become common 
in different areas, and they are not solely a military issue.48 Overall, expensive 
infrastructure can be employed more efficiently if it works to capacity. Pooling and 
sharing are means to increase utilization. A comparison with cooperation in these civilian 
areas will show that pooling and sharing may promise more output for the same money. 
In the economic field and in other public sectors, cooperation is common, and a 
comparison with this area may offer findings that are also true for cooperation between 
nations. In an interdisciplinary view, this study applies different economic and social 
theories and studies on pooling and sharing of the military in Europe, assuming that the 
                                                 
43SIPRI Yearbook 2011, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/files/SIPRIYB11summary.pdf, accessed 
03/12/2012. 
44For the newest defense data of the European countries see Chapter Four: Europe of The Military 
Balance 2012 (London: Routledge 2012, 112:1), 71–182, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0459-
7222.2012.663213, accessed 04/30/2012. 
45On March 7, 2012 NATO has published the newest “Financial and Economic Data Relating to 
NATO Defense: Defense expenditures of NATO countries (1990–2010),” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-
79287486-D7B07F73/natolive/news_71296.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 04/30/2012. 
46Since 2004 the European Defence Agency yearly publishes the defense data of the participating 
member countries. http://eda.europa.eu/publications/12–03–07/National_Defence_Data_2010, accessed 
04/30/2012. 
47Every year, for example, the European Defence Agency publishes an EU-U.S. Defense Data 
comparison. For the newest one (January 2012) see http://eda.europa.eu/publications/12–01–12/EU-
U.S._Defence_Data_2010and National Defence Data 2010.  
48Since the idea of pooling and sharing private used cars spread in the 1980s a lot of people have 
become very comfortable with this situation. They are still mobile but at much lower costs, and they do not 
have to worry about the maintenance, parking and other things. Doctors are conducting their profession on 
more and more specialized basis and working together in medical centers so that they are able to share 
expensive equipment. Certain sports require costly infrastructure and material. Usually they are organized 
in clubs in a way that infrastructure and material costs are shared by all members. 
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civil and military domains are similar enough to allow such an approach. Such topics as 
outsourcing, comparative advantages, and location factors seems to deliver useful 
explanations and hints for pooling, sharing, and other forms of military cooperation to 
enhance military output. Dependencies in the economic realm, for example, are equally 
unacceptable in the military domain.  
For years, NATO has been the important actor in Europe’s security issues. 
Therefore, NATO’s experiences with pooling and sharing provide ample sources to study 
state behavior and apply the results to military pooling and sharing in the European 
Union in general.  
The common security and defense policy of the European Union is based on EU 
regulations and institutions. However, the primary actors in defense issues remain the 
individual member states. Therefore, differences in national interests, threat perception, 
strategic culture, and political decision making are a primary focus of interest because 
they can be real obstacles and to pooling and sharing. The thesis concentrates primarily 
on the national specifics of France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, because 
these four states provide nearly three quarters of EU defense spending.  
 18 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. THE DEFENSE INTEREST TRILEMMA 
Security, national sovereignty, and resource efficiency are three factors that 
countries may choose to emphasize differently as a result of political and strategic 
culture, tradition and particular interests in their variety. An emphasis on two factors rules 
out the third, as Figure 1 elucidates.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Defense Interest Trilemma 
Up to now, the American emphasis, for example, has been on security and 
national sovereignty, leading to high defense spending49 and the unlimited option for 
unilateral behavior.50 One can suggest that, in view of the imperative of austerity, there 
                                                 
49In the wake of the 11 September attacks the U.S. defense budget grew more than 75 percent in the 
last ten years. For detailed data see SIPRI Yearbook 2011, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/files/-
SIPRIYB11summary.pdf or Figure 6. 
50The 2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that “America’s interests and role in the 
world require armed forces with unmatched capabilities and a willingness on the part of the nation to 
employ them in defense of our interests and the common good. The United States remains the only nation 
able to project and sustain large-scale operations over extended distances.” Further on this review asserts 
that “America’s Armed Forces will retain the ability to act unilaterally and decisively when appropriate, 
maintaining joint, all-domain military capabilities that can prevail across a wide range of contingencies. 
U.S. Department of defense, “U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2010, iv and 10, http://www.-
defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf, accessed 04/30/2012. 
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will be a future shift to more resource efficiency at the expense of national sovereignty 
and, perhaps, some lower demands in marginal areas of security if no major security 
threat might emerge. 
Most—if not all—EU states emphasize resource efficiency and national 
sovereignty with the typical effect of unilateral cuts and/or freeriding. In their view, the 
military means of the United States are large enough broadly to shelter the EU against 
outside threats. It is a matter of fact that the military strength of NATO highly depends on 
U.S. forces and weapons. “The United States is the indispensable member of NATO.”51 
But how do pooling and sharing affect EU members’ sovereignty in the area of 
security and defense? How sovereign are these states already in the realm of defense and 
security? Are they able to take unilateral action at all, or is their sovereignty limited to the 
decision to take part in a collective deployment or not? The militarily most powerful EU 
actors are the United Kingdom and France. Both are still capable of national nuclear 
strikes and autonomous expeditionary operations, and their status is largely built on these 
capabilities. However, collective actions with conventional forces, such as the 2011 
intervention in Libya, reveal the limits of EU overall arms in conflict. If such a brief and 
locally limited operation was not possible without the United States, one can draw 
conclusions about the futility of action by a single EU nation—unless the intervention is 
truly limited, as with some British and French operations in Africa.52 Thus, with a 
partnership-based view, resource-efficient security can be best guaranteed by de-
emphasizing national sovereignty. That results in defense integration and a division of 
labor, with pooling, and especially sharing of capabilities, fitting perfectly in this domain. 
                                                 
51International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012 (London: Routledge, 2012), 
40. Robert Gates advised the European allies as follows: “To avoid the very real possibility of collective 
military irrelevance, member nations must examine new approaches to boosting combat capabilities – in 
procurement, in training, in logistics, in sustainment.” Robert Gates, Speech in Brussels (June 11, 2011). 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/06/10/transcript-of-defense-secretary-gatess-speech-on-natos-
future/tab/print/. Leon Panetta, the incumbent U.S. Secretary of Defense said: “As for the United States, 
many might assume that the U.S. defense budget is so large that it can absorb and cover alliance 
shortcomings, but make no mistake about it; we are facing dramatic cuts with real implications for alliance 
capability. Leon Panetta, Brussels, Belgium, U.S. Department of Defense (October 5, 2011), 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1618, accessed 05/02/2012. 
52“Operations ponctuelles,” as the French call them. 
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By sharing capabilities in common, for example, countries can have access to assets that 
they are not capable of affording individually. 
B. POOLING AND SHARING AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
One fundamental question is, whether pooling and sharing limits EU members’ 
sovereignty. Jones argues that “nationalism and a desire to protect state sovereignty and 
autonomy will prevent EU states from attaining the same degree of military cooperation 
that they have achieved in the economic realm.”53 Jones might be right, because some 
states like the United Kingdom are really Euro-skeptical, and this view is supported by 
the majority of their citizenry. Such domestic factors might hinder a larger engagement in 
pooling and sharing. However, the European states are better off if they see the situation 
realistically and in the long term. Claudia Major54 argues that the years since 2007 with 
the financial crisis have shown that national sovereignty based on autonomy is illusory. 
In a globally interdependent world, in which major evolutions do not stop at state borders 
and in which risks are interdependent, only cooperation can preserve sovereignty. States 
are able to keep their sovereignty if they put together their individual and limited 
capacities to act. Member states’ sovereignty is already limited in the realm of war and 
peace and the use of armed force to the ends of policy. Pooling and sharing may be cost 
efficient but can also increase mutual dependence. Together with decision-making 
processes that demand unanimity, as in the EU’s common foreign and security policy, 
dependencies are likely to occur that paralyze the system when single states are able to 
jam key capabilities. Therefore, pooling and sharing is easier and more likely to happen 
in subsidiary areas like military education and training.  
Theodore Moran has examined American industrial dependencies from other 
states in the realm of defense.55 His research delivers valuable findings for pooling and 
                                                 
53Seth Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007.) 219. 
54Claudia Major, “Legitimation und Umrisse einer Europa-Armee,” Reader Sicherheitspolitik 
(September 2011), http://www.readersipo.de/portal/a/sipo, accessed 11/20/2011. 
55Theodore H Moran. “The Globalization of America’s Defense Industries: Managing the Threat of 
Foreign Dependence,” International Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 57–99. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538982, accessed 02/06/2012. 
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sharing. His basic consideration is that dependency from other countries is not a problem 
as long as there is enough competition between other companies or other countries. 
Moran describes a conflict between the economist and the defense strategist. While the 
economist worries about efficiency, the defense strategist is concerned with vulnerability 
and dependencies from other countries that might limit the nation’s sovereignty. Defense 
strategists want to have as much production as possible at home. As a matter of fact, the 
defense sector is so critical that the forces of markets and economic liberalism cannot 
solve the problems alone. Therefore, national governments have to intervene. But the 
question is how they should intervene so that these neo-mercantilist policies are in the 
state’s best interest. National preventive measures should primarily aim on strengthening 
the competition and not on protecting domestic capacities and industries that are not 
competitive. According to Moran’s examination, (Figure 2) the dividing line between a 
secure and an unsecure framework runs basically through the market situation.  
 
Key: A = competitive foreign suppliers 
B = competitive domestic suppliers 
C = the oil embargo 
D = the Soviet gas pipeline case 
 
E = the Nimrod case 
X = de Gaulle nightmare of total foreign dependency 
Y = multiple foreign and domestic suppliers 
 
 
Figure 2.   A Common Framework for Economists and National Security Analysts56 
                                                 
 56Theodore H. Moran. “The Globalization of America’s Defense Industries: Managing the Threat of 
Foreign Dependence, 71. 
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As long as there is enough competition, the situation is secure. Quasi-
monopolistic or narrow oligopolistic conditions symbolize an insecure setting. Whether 
companies are in foreign or domestic ownership is only of secondary interest. However, 
the worst case is a concentrated or nearly monopolistic market in foreign ownership. If 
the market is concentrated, but in domestic ownership, it is a little bit better, but still an 
insecure environment, because the countries’ influence on privately owned companies is 
mostly limited. On the contrary, a competitive market—whether in foreign or domestic 
ownership—is relatively secure. If a state has to depend on one single company in foreign 
ownership, it will produce the worst case for national security.  
Following his arguments, a national-security policy that aims for a secure 
environment should spend money smartly by promoting more competition. Strengthening 
the competition is better than enshrining uncompetitive national industries. A rule of 
thumb for a competitive market is the 4/50 rule, which suggests that if four independent 
actors control less than fifty percent of a market, there is enough competition, and it is 
unlikely that the participating companies will be able to coordinate their behavior in an 
unfavorable way, even if they share a common objective. 
Moran uses real cases and European experience to underpin his argument. In all 
these cases,57 the situation developed into a national problem because of a lack of own 
capabilities and too little competition or quasi-monopolistic markets. A competitive and 
specialized market is better insurance for a country than its own, sometimes obsolete or 
uncompetitive, industry or military. A state—even if it is as mighty as the United 
States—cannot provide competitive products and solutions for all technological areas. 
States have to specialize on domains where they have exceptional strength. 
The 4/50 rule is plausible for pooling and sharing, too, and seems to have 
untapped potential. Dependencies in the area of defense are not a comfortable situation. 
Having some mechanisms in mind, economic and efficiency interests on one side and 
defense strategist interest such as sovereignty on the other side, are compatible. Some 
                                                 
57Among others, the French dependency on U.S. technology by developing nuclear weapon, the oil 
embargo in the 1970s and the Soviet gas pipeline case. See legend A, B, C, D, and E in Figure 2. 
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other dependencies—for example the dependency on oil and other natural resources—can 
influence the economy much more. Thus, the influence of pooling and sharing on 
national autonomy should be kept in mind, but shouldn’t be overestimated. National 
strength and national vulnerability are based on many different factors. National autarchy 
as not an alternative, because it cannot ensure access to the growing global pool of 
technological and management skills, and is therefore at least as dangerous. Overall, 
pooling and sharing does not really coincide with a loss in sovereignty and dependency 
and does not have only negative implications. “Dependencies—that also teach the 
relationship between Europe and America—are not an expression of weakness, but, 
properly used, evidence of confidence, efficiency and strength.”58 
C. THE INTERFACE OF EFFICIENCY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
Military capabilities can be individually available by all nations, they can be 
pooled, commonly shared, provides by some nations in a role-share function or not 
available at all.59 Figure 3 displays a theoretical model showing the different levels of 
dependency and efficiency of national capabilities and how the EU military power could 
be improved by more extensive pooling and sharing. The underlying consideration is that 
capabilities that are not available at all or only available to a very few nations (in the red 
area) could be improved by pooling and sharing. Capabilities that are maintained by 
nearly all nations could be supplied more efficiently by reducing the number of providing 
countries. For that, pooling and sharing are also possible. 
                                                 
58Thomas de Maizière German Minister of Defense, Statement at the 48th Munich Security 
Conference (February 2012), http://www.securityconference.de/Dr-Thomas-de-Meiziere.809.0.html, 
accessed 03/10/2012. 
59This classification is general and not specifically military. It is also applicable in daily life: One can 
have an own car or dwelling or not, share cars or a habitat with others or rely on others, for example a taxi 
driver or a hotel, which provide the function when and where it is needed.  
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Figure 3.   Theoretical Framework for Strengthening European Military Capabilities 
Capabilities that are not available at all (category 1) should be built up as 
common-shared capabilities or as role-shared capabilities by some of the nations. The 
dependence on capabilities that are only maintained by one or two nations (category 2) 
could be reduced if these capabilities are changed in common-shared capabilities or if 
more nations took responsibility to the same role. The dependence on capabilities that can 
be provided by only a very few nations (category 3) could be reduced by encouraging 
more nations to acquire these capabilities. Efficiency could be improved by pooling these 
capabilities. Capabilities that are maintained by nearly all countries (category 4) could be 
reduced and pooled or commonly shared. This measure would not significantly affect 
national sovereignty. 
Measures of categories 1, 2, and 3 would strengthen capabilities but they would 
also tend to cost additional money. Measures in category 4 could achieve savings because 
they would eliminate duplication of capabilities. However, they would not strengthen 
capabilities or diminish capability gaps. Figure 4 illustrates the status of some selected 




Already secure and efficient: 
(A) AWACS 
(B) European Battle Group 
(C) C-17 
(E) European Air Transport Command 




(D) Missile Defense 
(M) Medical Evacuation 
(P) Precision Guided Ammunition 








Figure 4.   Examples of Selected Capabilities 
D. OUTSOURCING AND BETTER ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES 
The times of self-sufficient economies are long gone. As by pooling and sharing, 
today’s economics are based on a high division of labor. Outsourcing, as a process 
whereby special business functions are transferred to others, can give useful hints for 
pooling and sharing. On a national and international level, companies outsource fringe 
functions to other companies to concentrate on their core business, where they have real 
advantages. Outsourcing is very similar to role- or task-sharing. Both are ways of 
                                                 
60Nuclear capabilities are an exception in that the acquisition of such capabilities by additional EU 
nations would probably not enhance the security of the European Union as a whole in foreseeable 
circumstances. The curve in the model on the right side is intended to reflect this fact.  
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proceeding a higher form of division of labor. That creates open spaces for concentration 
on new things in the core business area, and is thought to strengthen expertise.  
Outsourcing is quite normal in open markets. A highly divisional economy 
delivers greater completions and is able to allocate labor and capital more efficiently with 
clear benefits in the long run. Despite some fears, outsourcing of goods and services does 
not stop at national borders.61 When a company decides to outsource business functions 
outside its own nation, better location factors, such as cheap labor, better-educated work 
forces, or natural resources and climatic conditions, are usually the primary reasons. As 
with pooling and sharing, the main alternative to outsourcing is to continue to do 
everything inside a company or country.  
Outsourcing and sharing is not a one-way street. Thus, it is also possible to 
insource business functions or to take an active role as a nation that shares its capabilities 
with others. In economics, supply and demand regulate price, and therefore insourcing 
will only be possible if the domestic location factors in a specific area are able to compete 
with other companies or countries. Shared capabilities have a value, too, which depends 
on how valuable and reliable these capabilities are considered by other nations. In 
economics, the competitiveness of a business area has to be the core of any calculation, 
and competitive disadvantages cannot easily be eradicated. 
Like outsourcing, sharing is not a problem as long as business is booming. As 
long as released work forces quickly find new jobs, the specter of such cuts is harmless. 
 
                                                 
61Outsourcing is a topic that is widely reflected in the scholarly literature and some people fear that 
outsourcing is a kind of sellout of domestic capabilities and it increases the number of unemployed people 
at home. One example that analysis the complexities, the limit and dangers and the net effect of outsourcing 
on the United States, is Murray Weidenbaum, Outsourcing: Pro and Cons, Business Horizons (July–August 
2005, vol. 48, iss. 4), 311–315. “Often the most effective (or only) way to achieve desired effectiveness is 
to outsource the entire activity—be  it energy, computer, communications, distribution, auditing, or 
facilities design, construction, or operation—to  a group that has the needed specialists yet can flexibly 
adapt outputs to meet internal divisional needs.” James Brian Quinn, Strategic Outsourcing: Leveraging 
Knowledge Capabilities. Sloan Management Review (1999, vol. 40, no. 4), 9–21.  
In the realm of economics, tariffs and other protective politics are used to contain international 
outsourcing, sometimes with negative effects. http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2486660. 
Daniel Drezner’s example of 45,000 to 75,000 lost jobs in the U.S. steel-using industry, indirectly caused 
by protecting the domestic steel producers, draws an unequivocally picture. See Daniel W. Drezner, The 
Outsourcing Bogeyman, Foreign Affairs, (Mai/June 2004, no. 22), 83. 
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In times of recession, however, people make a bogeyman out of all things that go along 
with reductions. Such domestic factors have to be considered when it is expedient to 
diminish national capabilities.  
The realm of defense is mostly considered a national core function and therefore 
to be sequestered from sharing with others. The negative effects can be similar when the 
adherence to ineffective areas of defense leads to a suppression of other areas, because 
every dollar or Euro can be spent only once. In the end, with a multinational division of 
work in the area of defense, all nations will be better off, because specialization leads to 
cheaper capabilities with higher quality. Assuming that the times are over where 
European states fight against each other, any improvement of European military 
capability is not a zero-sum game. In other words, one state’s improvement of military 
capabilities does not have to be another state’s loss, but an improvement for all. However, 
states want to act independently and shy away from giving up any sovereignty in defense 
issues. 
E. HOW TO IMPLEMENT POOLING AND SHARING 
A lot of military assets remain durable for a longer time as they are functional and 
cost efficient. The effect of pooling and sharing is not worth the effort if the old furniture 
in the European house, as it were, is only arranged in a new way. It is necessary to 
separate useful from useless and eradicate over-capacities. Figure 5 illustrates how to 
implement pooling and sharing efficiently. 
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Figure 5.   How to Implement Pooling and Sharing 
It is important that the EU member states make a common analysis of their 
interests and agree on capabilities that are needed (no. 1). They need to access the actual 
spectrum of capabilities (no. 2) and make a target-actual-comparison that reveals the need 
for changes (no. 3). Lacking capabilities (no. 4a) should be acquired as common-shared 
capabilities or as role-shared capabilities, in countries with the best location factors62.  
While some shortcomings in interesting technological fields might be filled by 
some nations voluntarily, expensive capabilities in edge areas that do not assure a major 
right of say are unlikely to be filled without incentives.63 
Redundant capabilities (no. 4b) should be abandoned in these countries in which 
they entail the highest costs. All other capabilities (no. 4c) could be analyzed to 
 
 
                                                 
62Capabilities, for example, that need many personnel should not be built up in countries in which the 
costs for personnel are extremely high. 
63Areas like logistics are expensive and guarantee not a major say in core military decision processes. 
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determine whether (and to what extent) they have potential for pooling and role-sharing. 
Institutions could play a decisive role in initiating such an analysis and enhancing further 
cooperation. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Pooling and sharing is a wide field that opens more opportunities than to just put 
some assets together in the same location to save costs. Pooling bundles the 
responsibilities, and because of the economy of scales, efficiency is much higher. 
Pooling and sharing is able to provide efficient solutions for military needs that—if 
properly organized—provides better quality than the present patchwork of European 
military capabilities. Applying economic theories to pooling and sharing provides several 
ways to promote and foster pooling and sharing solutions. However, in the realm of 
security and defense, it can be problematical if a single state, motivated by domestic 
issues, has the ability to block military capabilities because this state is the single 
provider of a specialized capability. Therefore, pooling and sharing should be organized 
in a way that the system has redundancies. Role-shared capabilities should be made 
available by at least two or three nations. The 4/50 rule is a good measurement to avoid 
unwanted dependencies and monopolistic situations. Then, a nation that does not want to 
participate will not paralyze the whole system. 
As the next chapter make obvious, these theories are not simply and entirely 
applicable because governmental actors and political elites as well as special interest 
groups and institutions are following own and highly diverse agendas. In reality domestic 
factors and interests—other than military ones—strongly influence politics in the military 
realm. In Europe, “a lack of specialization creates excessive redundancies. Though plans 
have been put forward to address these issues, they are rarely implemented, often because 
of domestic politics.”64  
                                                 
64Richard Weitz, “Transatlantic Defense Troubles,” Strategic Insights (winter 2011, vol. 10, iss. 3), 
52.  
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III. MILITARY DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS 
A. EUROPEAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
The member states of the European Union together post the world’s second 
largest defense outlays, after those of the United States. Nonetheless, the results of this 
spending, in the form of deployable military forces, satisfies neither the European 
member states nor their close Atlantic ally, the United States—though for different 
political and strategic reasons. Even before the Euro crisis of 2009 and onward, EU states 
viewed even this status-quo defense spending as more than enough. The decline of 
defense budgets across Europe and austerity measures make it unrealistic to expect 
improvements in European military capabilities by increased defense spending. 
Therefore, it is important that European governments utilize their scarce treasure more 
efficiently. 
The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security, 
Catherine Ashton, wrote on 23 May 2011 that the Council of the European Union “wants 
to turn the financial crisis and its impact on national-defense budgets into an opportunity 
for greater cooperation in the area of capability development.”65 The Council sees 
pooling and sharing as a long-term approach and “encourages member states to apply 
pooling and sharing on a systematic and sustainable basis promoting multinational 
cooperation, including on a regional basis, as a key method to preserve and develop 
military capabilities.”66 As Figure 6 shows, Europe’s defense budget has been nearly 
unchanged over the last twenty years and is therefore no match for the combined North 
American budget.  
                                                 






Figure 6.   World Defense Spending 1992–2010 (in Billions of U.S. Dollars)67 
While the U.S. defense budget grew more than 75 percent in the last ten years in 
the wake of the 11 September attacks,68 in Europe, in the last two decades after the end 
of the Cold War, the peace dividend was harvested at least twice or threefold, and all 
member states of the EU “are seeking to do more with less.”69 
As Figure 7 displays, the defense spending in Europe is relatively concentrated. 
As analysis of the defense budgets shows, the Pareto effect occurs nearly textbook-like in 
the realm of European defense expenditures, when 20 percent of the states provide 
80 percent of the funding. The ten biggest defense spenders inside the European Union 
 
 
                                                 
67Figure 6 is based on data provided by the SIPRI Yearbook 2011. 
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/files/SIPRIYB11summary.pdf, accessed 03/12/2012. 
68While U.S. defense spending has nearly doubled since 2000, EU defense spending has been steadily 
reduced. The EU has more inhabitants than the United States but nearly half the defense spending. 
69Bastian Giegerich. Military Capabilities: Time for Capitals to Act in Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth 
and Bastian Giegerich, “Europe: A Time for Strategy,” Egmont Paper 27 (Gent: Academia Press, January 
2009), 29. 
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 account for more than 90 percent of the whole EU defense outlay. More than half of the 
states contribute less than one percent, but still weigh in with a full vote in any decision-
making processes that require unanimity. 
 
 
Figure 7.   European Union Defense Spending 2010 in A-B-C Clusters 
(in Millions of U.S. Dollars)70 
When the defense contributions of the European Union member states are as 
different as displayed, a clustering A-B-C analysis 71 can help to set the lever at the right 
place. If every nation continues to spend its money without coordinating with its allies or 
partners—or, worse, unilaterally cuts its military spending as a short-term response to the 
                                                 
70Based on data provided by the European Defence Agency “Defence Data: EDA participating 
Member States in 2010,” (January 18, 2012), 2. http://eda.europa.eu/publications/12–03–
07/National_Defence_Data_2010, accessed 03/07/2012. More than half of the states contribute less than 1 
percent of the overall EU defense spending. 
71A-B-C analyses are used to divide substantial from insubstantial parts, where A-parts are the parts 
that contribute to 70–80 percent of the results, B-parts additional 10–20 and C-parts only 5 to 10 percent. 
Therefore, any effort for rationalizing should firstly address the A-category.  
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financial crisis—improvements in capability are not likely. Indeed, European security 
could suffer, perhaps significantly. However, the behavior of the small contributors does 
not really have an effect on the overall output. What is more important is how the biggest 
states spend their money. 
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy are the four leading nations that provide more 
than half of the military personnel of the European Union and nearly seventy percent of 
defense expenditures. Consequently, the European Union’s military power depends 
highly on the capabilities of these four countries, and the behavior of these four will 
largely determine the future of the whole military integration process.  
B. POOLING AND SHARING IN TIMES OF AUSTERITY 
For states, it is always a question how much to spend on defense. “Reductions or 
increases in the budget percentages … are crucial indicators of where governments put 
their priorities.”72 As long as there was a common threat, states and citizenry were 
willing to put a lot of more effort on defense. Defense spending of the NATO agreed-
upon two percent of GDP is the exception, as Table 1 highlights. The average in Europe 
is 1.6 percent with clearly decreasing tendency.73 
                                                 
72According to Budge, in Great Britain “the shares for defence and agriculture drop steadily over the 
whole [post-1945] period, while expenditure on the social areas … generally goes up.” Ian Budge, “Great 
Britain and Ireland: Variations in Party Government,” 46. 
73“Today, only just five of 28 allies – the U.S., U.K., France, Greece, along with Albania – exceed the 
agreed 2% of GDP spending on defense,” noted Robert M. Gates, at that time U.S. Secretary of Defense, in 
his speech about NATO’s future security agenda in Brussels on June 10, 2011, 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581, accessed 12/03/2012. 
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Table 1.   EU and U.S. Defense Spending in Percent of the GDP74 
France and especially Italy are strongly affected by the current financial crisis, 
and further budgetary cuts are very likely. 
Analyzing the bargaining and burden-shifting in NATO, Wallace J. Thies presents 
some interesting findings on the likelihood of cooperation that are illustrated in Figure 8 
and also true for the ongoing attempts to promote pooling and sharing inside the 
European Union. Thies concludes that, cooperation between states is much easier in times 
of plentiful resources and with a common outside threat (Case 1). In Europe, both factors 
seem to be absent in recent times (Case 4), and that makes it harder for states to 
 
 
                                                 
74NATO members agreed at the 2002 summit in Prague on a defense spending goal of 2 percent of 
GDP. In Table 1, defense spending that reaches at least 1.8 percent of GDP is shown in green, defense 
spending of less than one percent of GDP is marked in red, all others are highlighted in orange. The last 
column shows the average defense spending of the last five years. Based on data provided by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), http://milexdata.sipri.org, accessed 03/07/2012. 
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cooperate. If the threat level increases75 and the resources remain scarce (Case 2), he sees 
a danger of political conflicts. As long as the threat level stays low, a better economic 
situation will not enhance the prospects for multinational cooperation, because there is no 
stimulus or incentive for such cooperation (Case 3). 
 
Figure 8.   Ease of Cooperation76 
These findings suggest that times of austerity are not propositions for enhanced 
cooperation.77 In times of low threat and scarce resources, burden-shifting and free-riding 
are more likely than real cooperation. 
                                                 
75Such situations could occur through higher threats through other states (for example by a nuclear 
capable Iran, or a huge rearmament of Russia or an uncooperative behavior of China) or a strong reduction 
of the U.S. capabilities on that Europe strongly relies at the moment. Hopefully, there will be no European 
9/11 weak-up call. “It will not be any European statesman who will unite Europe; Europe will be united by 
the Chinese.”—Charles de Gaulle. 
76Figure 8 is based on Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO 
(New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 256.  
77In contrast, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security, 
Catherine Ashton, wrote on May 23, 2011 that the Council of the European Union “wants to turn the 
financial crisis and its impact on national defense budgets into an opportunity for greater cooperation in the 
area of capability development.” 3091st Foreign Affairs Council meeting (Brussels, May 23, 2011) Press 
Release, 1. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122187.pdf, 
accessed 03/12/2012. 
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C. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING 
Technological-innovation cycles go faster and faster. Considering the size and 
capacities of European states, it is obvious that it is impossible for these states to stay 
technologically up-to-date in all military areas without distinctly enhancing defense 
spending. In the existing system, procurement cycles are not able to keep pace with 
technological innovation, and acquisitions—whether national or international—are to 
long-lasting and complex.  
Figure 9 illustrates the commitment of life cycle cost over a product life cycle. 
The biggest part of the overall life cycle costs of a weapon system is fixed in the 
development phase. Therefore, really effective pooling and sharing has to start right at the 
beginning of the procurement cycle. Pooling and sharing is most effective when material 
demands are aligned from the beginning. 
 
Figure 9.   Commitment of Life-Cycle Cost Over the Product Life Cycle78 
Common research and development/technology lays a solid foundation. In the 
modern military, numbers and kinds of weapon systems are the factors that dominate 
structural organization. Therefore, significant sharing solutions, such as NATO-AWACS, 
                                                 
78Anna Sandberg, Ulrika Strömberg, “Gripen: with focus on availability performance and life support 
cost over the product life cycle,” Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering (1999, vol. 5, no. 4), 327. 
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are based on common material assets. However, “attempting to harmonize technical 
requirements is difficult or impossible if the underlying thinking on conceptual 
requirements, and financial and timescale expectations, has not been converged from the 
outset.”79 To meddle with established national systems, attempting to pool them 
afterwards generates only limited revenues. Caused by the complexity, higher cost for 
personnel stationed abroad, and required adaptations, pooling and sharing of established 
capabilities can sometimes cause costs that are higher than revenues.80 
Moran makes some sound recommendations about how to spend in a way that 
will contribute to more competition. In particular funding that is spent on research and 
development (R&D) can contribute to more competition if it is spent wisely. According 
to Moran, R&D money should strictly adhere to the 4/50 rule, and such money should not 
be spend for companies or countries that belong to an already concentrated market or 
cartel. In the EU, a multinational coordination of R&D should be possible because the 
budgets are highly concentrated as Figure 10 displays. 
 
Figure 10.   European Union Military Research and Development Spending 2010 
(in Millions of U.S. Dollars)81 
                                                 
79European Defence Agency Initial long-term Vision for European Defence capabilities and capacity 
needs (Brussels October 3, 2006) 21, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_-
policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33238_en.htm, accessed 03/15/2012. 
80To a certain extent, transport issues seem to be an exception because their generated output is 
relatively universal. 
81Figure 10 is based on data provided by the European Defence Agency. http://eda.europa.eu/publica-
tions/12–03–07/National_Defence_Data_2010, accessed 03/07/2012. 
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Some 93 percent of that money is spent by only three nations: France, United 
Kingdom and Germany. Only six European states (the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden) have industrial capacities considerable enough to 
develop and build international, competitive, weapon systems.  
Every Euro (or dollar) can be spent only once, and it is not likely that defense 
spending will be palpably increased. Therefore, it is very important to spend on projects 
that will have a payoff for defense, and rely on private financed R&D in areas where civil 
use dominates. 
D. MILITARY PERSONNEL 
The regions in Europe have different economic structures, but overall, the total of 
around two million soldiers in Europe encumbers so many resources that there is not 
enough money left for materiel investments. Policy requires a change in this state of 
affairs. “Economics is primarily about the efficient use of scarce resources, and the notion 
of opportunity cost plays a crucial part in ensuring that resources are indeed being used 
efficiently.”82 
The theory of comparative advantage83 states that if countries specialize in 
producing goods where they have a lower opportunity cost - then there 
will be an increase in economic welfare. … Even if one country is more 
efficient in the production of all goods (absolute advantage) than the other, 
both countries will still gain by trading with each other, as long as they 
have different relative efficiencies.84 
In reviewing their military capabilities nations should think about considering 
comparative advantages, too. The biggest part of defense spending is expenditure for 
personnel, and there are big differences between the European Union nations. Figure 11 
                                                 
82The Economist: “Economic A-Z: Opportunity costs,” http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-
z/o#node-21529616, accessed 03/10/2012. 
83In his 1817 book On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, David Ricardo explained the 
theory of comparative advantage. In his example Portugal could produce both wine and cloth with less 
labor than England. However, England was relatively better at producing cloth. Therefore, it made sense 
for England to export cloth and import wine from Portugal. 
84Economics help, “Dictionary: comparative advantage,” http://www.economicshelp.org/dictionary-
/c/comparative-advantage.html, accessed 03/10/2012. 
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displays the average defense spending for one person (soldier, gendarme, or civil 
personnel) funded by each national-defense budget. 
 
Figure 11.   Average Defense Expenditures 2010 in U.S. Dollar per Military Personnel85 
This graph seems to offer opportunities to distribute defense capabilities 
differently from how it is done today. But in the same way as the military weapons of the 
nations are not equal or simply comparable, that is all the more true for the military 
personnel. National differences in education, diverse traditions, preparedness, training 
and other factors are likely to explain a great part of these differences. However, the 
dominant share of more than 50% personnel costs in the EU’s overall defense spending 
allows not setting the personnel costs aside although “these distributions will not soon 
change due to the rigidity of many military pay structures.”86 A proper part of the 
average spending differences is likely to be the result of diverse location factors, such as 
                                                 
85Based on data provided by the European Defence Agency, http://eda.europa.eu/publications/12–03–
07/National_Defence_Data_2010, accessed 03/07/2012.The part of personnel costs of the defense budget 
divided through the number of civil and military personnel paid out of the defense budget. The red marked 
countries include conscript personnel. 
86Richard Weitz, “Transatlantic Defense Troubles” Strategic Insights (winter 2011, vol. 10, iss. 3), 59. 
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obvious lower level of personnel costs In a Europe-wide view, states with low personnel 
costs have location advantages and personnel-intensive military functions should be 
arranged in these countries. High-cost countries should concentrate their efforts on 
cutting-edge technology with lower manning requirements. So far the economic theory; 
in practice, such arrangements will immediately experience their political limitations as 
long as the national differences are as diverse as outlined in chapter IV. The realization of 
such a division of labor will be extremely difficult and highly sensitive. Up to now, there 
are tentative attempts to open the military service of single nations on EU level, such as 
in Belgium, but they are more the exception87 than the rule. In Germany such attempts 
did not overcome the first obstacles.88 A very special example for military multi-
nationality with its own history is the French Légion Étrangère.89 In the United States the 
service in the military is not limited to U.S. citizenship. 90 
                                                 
87 In 2004, Belgium, as one of the highest costs countries in Figure 11, started such a recruiting 
campaign. Citizens of all EU member states can apply to military service in the Belgian army. An essential 
prerequisite is French or Dutch language skills. More information is available at http://www.mil.be / jobs 
available. See Embassy of Belgium in Berlin “Nachbar Belgien, Eine Publikation der Belgischen Botschaft 
in Berlin” (March 2004 / no. 2), http://www.diplomatie.be/berlin/media/berlin/Nachbar%20Belgien%202–
04.pdf, accessed 05/02/2012. 
88In 2011 Germany, the German Ministry of Defence considered to open the military service in the 
Bundeswehr for citizens without German nationality. See Federal Ministry of Defence, “Massnahmenpaket 
zur Steigerung der Attraktivitaet,” 13, http://aussen-sicherheitspolitik.de/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/-
110105-BMVg-F%C2%9F-S-I-Ma%C2%A7nahmenpaket-Attraktivit%C3%A4t.pdf.This proposal was 
stopped and not further detailed. See Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Kurzmeldungen Deutschland: 
Ausländer in der Bundeswehr, March 22, 2011, http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-
migration/56914/kurzmeldungen-deutschland, accessed 05/04/2012.  
89Founded in the first half of the 19th century the Légion Étrangère is directly subordinated to the 
French president. Today the “7699 legionnaires and non-commissioned officers hailing from 136 different 
countries, including France.” see http://www.legion-recrute.com/en/, accessed 05/02/2012. 
90The number of legal-resident soldiers without U.S. citizenship has grown. Often the military service 
allows this so called “green card soldiers” applying for U.S. citizenship. According to the U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS) “in fiscal year 2010 it granted citizenship to 11,146 members of the 
U.S. armed forces at ceremonies in the United States and 22 countries abroad. This figure represents the 
highest number of service members naturalized in any year since 1955. This number is a 6 percent increase 
from the 10,505 naturalizations in fiscal year 2009 and a significant increase from the 7,865 naturalizations 
in fiscal year 2008. Since September 2001, USCIS has naturalized nearly 65,000 service men and women, 
including those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Homepage of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 





A broader implementation is likely to spark a glowing debate about not only 
classes but nations that buy themselves out of military duty and danger.91 However, with 
end of the conscription in nearly all EU nations, inside the European nations such a status 
is reality: military service is done by volunteers and mostly no more a common duty for 
all. The individual willingness to serve in the military highly depends on alternative 
opportunities. 92 
If personnel-intensive military tasks in Europe are tendentiously trans-located to 
lower-income-level countries and these states get support by common funding and state-
of-the-art equipment, all are better off. This basic economic principle should be 
considered and at least partly applied to Europe’s military especially in those areas that 
are similar and comparable.  
The demographic development enhances the need. Some countries such as 
Germany, Italy or Hungary, face huge demographic problems. The former population 
pyramid is turned upside down. Therefore, in these states young people are, or will, 
become a really scarce resource. 
 
 
                                                 
91For such kind of discussions see Michael Wolffsohn, “Die Unterschicht übernimmt die 
Landesverteidigung” Welt-online (January 16, 2011),  http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/-
article12186329/Die-Unterschicht-uebernimmt-die-Landesverteidigung.html, accessed 05/02/2012. 
92Regional differences inside the United States influence the distribution of military contributions in a 
similar way. The recruiting of military personnel in the United States differs from state to state. While most 
of the armament is produced in the northeast part of the United States, or in some regions in California, the 
southern states and other less industrialized states clearly provide more military personnel. While Alabama, 
Oklahoma, and Texas contributed around seven recruits per 10,000 inhabitants for the U.S. forces in 2004, 
states like Ohio, California, or Michigan generated only 0.5 recruits. Montana (8.5) contributed twentyfold 
more recruits than Michigan (0.4). These figures express the number of total military recruits in 2004 from 
the Army, Army Reserves, Navy, Navy Reserves and the Air Force. Per capita figures expressed per 10,000 
population. Source: Statemaster.com, “Military Statistics,” http://www.statemaster.com/graph/mil_tot-
_mil_rec_arm_nav_air_for_percap-navy-air-force-per-capita, accessed 03/09/2012.  
Considering only the age group of 18–24 year olds, the differences are similar. While in 2010 the northeast 
region contributed only fifteen recruits per 10,000 people in this age range, the southern region provided 
28.3 recruits, nearly ninety percent more military personnel. See National Priorities Project, “Military 
Recruiting,,” http://nationalpriorities.org/en/publications/2011/military-recruitment-2010/ , accessed 
03/09/2012. 
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International pooling is often connected with stationing military personnel in 
foreign countries what causes much higher costs for the sending nations as stationing 
soldiers at home.93 Therefore, areas that are personnel intensive are not best suited for 
pooling. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Pooling and sharing will only save money when at least the major European 
defense spenders are involved—United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, and a few 
other nations. Encouraging pooling and sharing only in peripheral areas, or without the 
participation of the major defense providers, will not change the face of the EU defense 
posture.94 
Just as it is not economical to operate a hospital in every small city, it isn’t 
possible to have high specialized forces in every small country. The European Union is a 
political organization, and in the same way a partnership of convenience. Specialization 
is the dictate of the moment. As in economics, all states are better off if they focus on 
their strengths. A concept that prioritizes width to depth exhausts scarce resources.  
If Germany, for example, takes seriously its announcement that unilateral 
deployments are not an option, then it is incumbent to dispense with certain capabilities 
and rely on other European member states. Such a relinquishment can be a confidence-
building measure. Dependency can be reduced to measures like the 4/50 rule. With four 
states contributing more than 75 percent, the 4/50 rule cannot be applied. There are two 
ways to generate less concentration: One is to integrate relatively capable partners outside 
the EU, for example Turkey, Norway, or Canada. The other way is to strengthen the 
                                                 
93 Stationing troops in foreign countries has mostly political or strategic reasons that have regularly to 
be reviewed. The U.S. decision, for example to reduce their army troops stationed in Germany and the 
British decision to draw back its 20,000 or so soldiers stationed in Germany is consequential, because there 
is no urgent political need. While Britain can for the same money maintain a lot of more troops at home the 
United States are able to shift its troops to more urgent needs. 
94Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont.”Security Policy Brief Pooling & Sharing: From Slow March to 
Quick March?” (Brussels: Egmont Institute, May 2011, no. 23), http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers-
/11/sec-gov/SPB23-BiscopCoelmont.pdf, accessed 11/20/2012. 
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capabilities of the medium-sized countries inside the EU, such as Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Spain, or Poland. Both ways are not mutual exclusive. 
Austerity is not the best time for closer defense cooperation. The economic crisis 
has led to further decreases in defense budgets; however, the downward defense spending 
trends pre-date the economic crisis. 
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IV. NATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND CHARACTERISTICS 
Not only do the defense expenditures of the EU member states vary, but also their 
military ambitions, strategic culture, national interests, threat perception, and preferred 
partners. Analysis shows that several impediments hamper pooling and sharing of 
military capabilities between two or more EU member states and that national interests 
and openness to participate in pooling and sharing arrangements are highly diverse. 
Several stumbling blocks are discussed in Tomas Valasek’s relatively skeptical article 
“Surviving Austerity.”95 He argues that deep cooperation remains highly sensitive: 
governments are reluctant to build joint units because this may require them to share 
decisions on how and when to use them. According to his findings, military integration 
works best when participating countries have similar strategic cultures, a high level of 
mutual trust, comparable attitudes towards the defense industry, and relatively low 
corruption in defense procurement. For pooling and sharing to work, many of these 
factors have to align. He predicts that “future defense integration will remain an 
exception rather than the rule.”96 In his view, the idea that EU defense could begin 
around a single core group and spread out with a “snowball-effect” is unrealistic, because 
of different threat perceptions, political interests, and military cultures. 
In general, states use their capabilities and resources to provide security, promote 
national interests, and maintain and improve their positions in the international system. 
Military force is one of the most potent instruments and can easily be translated into 
power. However, as Helga Welsh has observed, “Power cannot be strictly measured; it is 
a relative term that must take into account verifiable indicators, such as economic and 
military clout, as well as the willingness to use it and other people’s perception of it.”97 
                                                 
95Tomas Valasek, “Surviving Austerity: The Case for a New Approach to EU Military 
Collaboration,” (London: Centre for European Reform, 2011), 8. 
96Ibid., 29.  
97Helga A. Welsh, “Germany: Ascent to Middle Power,” in Ronald Tiersky and John Van Oudenaren, 
eds., European Foreign Policies: Does Europe Still Matter? (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2010), 220. 
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This chapter will compare the different positions of these four major European 
nations, with a special focus on obstacles to further cooperation and what hinders states 
from being willing to cooperate by pooling and sharing their capabilities. 
A. MILITARY AMBITIONS 
According to Bastian Giegerich,  
a country’s level of ambition (in the military sense) is a function of its 
broader goals, which in turn are shaped by many factors: history, 
geography, military traditions, politics, demographics, foreign policy, 
threat perception, membership of international organizations, and 
economic and financial strength.98 
 The United Kingdom has a self-perception as a major power with global security 
interests and responsibilities. Its military ambitions underpin its leading function in 
international institutions such as the UN, the Commonwealth and NATO.99 France places 
emphasis on military instruments as well as on the political power that France draws from 
its status.100 Germany’s military ambitions are that of a “self-restraining but responsible 
power [that is] embedded in Europe.”101 As Germany, Italy has a preference for civilian 
instruments and rejects militarism and force as instruments for pursuing national 
interests. Italy likes to interact with institutionalized multilateral frameworks.102 In a 
metaphorical sense, the military capabilities of the European Union are like a left hand 
(Figure 12). As the thumb, the United Kingdom is connected but a little bit separated 
                                                 
98Bastian Giegerich. “Military Capabilities: Time for Capitals to Act,” in Sven Biscop, Jolyon 
Howorth and Bastian Giegerich. eds. Europe: A Time For Strategy, Egmont Paper 27(Academia Press, 
Gent, January 2009), 29, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep27.pdf, accessed 20/03/2012. 
99Elke Krahmann, “United Kingdom: Punching Above Its Weight,” in Emil J. Kirchner and James 
Sperling, eds., Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the Twenty-First 
Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 109. 
100Thierry Tardy, “France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy,” in Emil J. Kirchner and James 
Sperling, eds., Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the Twenty-First 
Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 43. 
101Alexander Siedschlag, “Germany: From a Reluctant Power to a Constructive Power?” in Emil J. 
Kirchner and James Sperling, eds., Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 
Twenty-First Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 63. 
102Paolo Foradori and Paolo Rosa, “Italy: New Ambitions and Old Deficiencies,” in Emil J. Kirchner 
and James Sperling, eds., Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the Twenty-
First Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 88. 
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from the rest and tries to keep a tight hold on European defense. France is not 
coincidentally best expressed by the index finger, pointing and demanding what has to be 
done. Like the thumb and especially together with it, these fingers are capable of limited 
autonomous action. Germany as the middle finger has the most volume. This finger’s 
overall strength is comparable to the former two, but a middle finger is usually not used 
for individual or separate action. Italy, as the ring finger with its comparable smaller 
capabilities, expresses the sense of togetherness. The ring finger and the little finger, 
expressing all the other EU nations, are not capable of powerful individual actions. 
However, if they are hurt, they can negatively influence the whole hand. Really powerful 
actions are only possible when all fingers work together. Clenched as a fist, the hand is 
much more resistant to the outside and able to punch back. Staying with this metaphor, 
the United States is the missing strong right hand. The world is definitely not left-handed 
and the European hand is not accustomed to being used in the first place.  
 
Figure 12.   The “Left-handed” European Defense 
Figure 13 expresses the different military ambitions of EU member states. The 
positions of the spheres are determined by the relative defense spending per GDP and the 
percentage of deployed troops, while the size of the sphere indicates absolute defense 
spending. The military ambitions of the big four European states are different. The 
spheres of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are similar in size; but as a 
percentage of GDP, the United Kingdom spends more than twice the amount of Germany 
or Italy and has twice as many military personnel in deployments.  
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Figure 13.   European Union Comparison of Military Ambitions 2010103 
B. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THREAT PERCEPTION 
The European States “are sometimes divided on key issues, and fail to coordinate 
their actions effectively.”104 There are comparatively few basic differences between the 
big four states’ views about the threat assessment of Russia. A large group of EU states, 
                                                 
103Size of spheres corresponds to sum of defense spending 2010. Based on data provided by the 
European Defence Agency “Defence Data: EDA participating Member States in 2010,” (January 18, 2012) 
, http://eda.europa.eu/publications/12–03–07/National_Defence_Data_2010, accessed 03/07/2012.  
Partly, the defense expenditures include costs for pensions. For Italy, for example, other sources calculate a 
defense spending of 1 percent of GDP if such spending is subtracted. Germany did not provide figures 
about military deployment to EDA but the deployment figures are distributed electronically through the 
Federal Ministry of Defence. http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NY3BCsMgEET_yL331-
q9o04tonOgS3QTdJODX11LCHAbe8Bj60Ii4k6NT3sRletM088NfxpczmsZzQk1gbfuWWXk1YGlOu-
10OVBsgdqmM0f8B2jFotf6QgHYh1dvoLmUIvX6XOdIUQHspzy8K-RtX/ , accessed 04/09/2012. 
104Charles Grant, “Is Europe Doomed to Fail as a Power?” (London: Centre for European Reform, 
2009), 8, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay_905–1273.pdf, 
accessed 20/03/2012. 
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including Germany, Italy, Spain, and (usually) France, always supports engagement with 
Russia. Even though Britain is comparatively moderate, the Baltic States, Poland, and 
Sweden still sniff trouble in the wind. 
“Europe lacks a common strategic culture: some countries take defence seriously 
and believe in intervening to solve security problems, and some do not.”105 Britain and 
France are exceptional in the European Union in that both have worldwide ambitions and 
interests.106 Both countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council and both 
underpin their power by independent nuclear forces.107 These weapons have to be 
“regarded as a purely national insurance premium.”108 They separate both countries from 
the non-nuclear-weapon-state members of the EU and facilitate the retention, with limited 
efforts, of an effective deterrence posture and a major power status. 
The United Kingdom strongly relies on its special relationship with the United 
States. France tries to hold up its status as a world power, and in France the need for 
military means is broadly accepted as part of the national ethos. France’s definition of its 
vital interests is comparatively broad109 and the French threshold for the use of military 
                                                 
105Charles Grant, “Is Europe Doomed to Fail as a Power,” 18. 
106Up to now, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has not been able to develop 
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108Marc Ullmann, “Security Aspects in French Foreign Policy,” Survival (1973, vol. 15, no. 6), 263. 
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Chirac, speech at Landivisiau-l’Ile Longue/Brest, 19 January 2006, www.elysee.fr.  
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forces is lower than in many other EU countries.110 To the extent that France’s interests 
and attitudes converge with those of other EU states, France uses “the European stage as 
a geopolitical amplifier and multiplier of French influence.”111 In the 2011 Libyan 
intervention, for example, France was the driving factor that fueled the decision-making 
process, and France took the lead in Europe.112 
France strongly promotes further European integration, but at the same time 
France is mindful of maintaining her independent and autonomous decisions. Africa is 
historically of high interest to France, but not for most of the other EU states. The 2008 
French Defense White Paper favors a “united Europe, consistent in the area of 
defence.”113 France wants the European Union to be more capable of conducting peace 
support missions, and at the same time France is focusing more of its attention on 
Asia.114 
Germany is fully integrated in international structures and acts as a soft power 
using civilian instruments but also employs military power, if reluctantly. In economic 
issues, Germany is a powerhouse, and Europe’s locomotive. As one of the largest 
exporting nations in the world, Germany is particularly dependent on international 
                                                 
110In Germany, for example, the threshold for the use of military force is much higher. In 2010, the 
then German President Horst Köhler mentioned “national economic interests” in a radio interview, and he 
stepped back when the media criticized his statement, connecting his words to the German deployment of 
forces in Afghanistan. Sebastian Fischer and Veit Medick, „Köhler entfacht neue Kriegsdebatte” Spiegel 
online, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,696982,00.html, accessed 05/03/2012. 
111Ronald Tiersky. “France: Nostalgia, Narcissism, and Realism” in Ronald Tiersky and John Van 
Oudenaren, eds., European Foreign Policies: Does Europe Still Matter? (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 162. 
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113French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 24, Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/france/french-white-paper-defence-national-security/p16615 , accessed 03/17/2012. 
114Ibid., 7, 18. 
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stability, free trade, and a secure and reliable flow of resources.115 However, for years, 
Germany’s military has had to live with an underfunded transformation process116 
because Germany’s financial priorities lie in other areas.117 Germany is far from being a 
leading military power and shows no such ambitions. Military forces are not Germany’s 
preferred means for influencing world politics and security.118 However, power interests 
cannot be denied.119 
Overall, Germany’s population feels secure and safe. Germany’s geostrategic 
position in the heart of Europe, surrounded by friendly neighbors, makes an attack on its 
territorial integrity very unlikely.120 Germany’s populace does not feel threatened by the 
                                                 
115The German “economy is by far the largest in Europe and the fourth largest in the world.” Helga 
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had proved inadequate.” John S. Duffield, “Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds 
Neorealism,” International Organization (1999), 765–803. 
119Germany’s attempts, for example, to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council can be seen 
as a clear sign of its determination to have a greater say in international affairs. 
120Chapter 1of the German White paper 2006 describes the Fundamentals of German Security Policy. 
International terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disintegration of states are some 
of the mentioned threats. German Ministry of Defense, “White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and 
the Future of the Bundeswehr,” (Berlin, October 2006), 14, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/germany-
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military forces of other states,121 and for Germany, terrorism is not an extraordinary or 
imminent threat and certainly not a reason to attack other states. 
Italy has to struggle with difficult domestic factors, such as unstable political 
situations,122 political corruption, huge deficits, and a great north–south divide. These 
factors have led some European observers to see Italy more as a problem child than a 
bastion of calm. However, Italy wants to be taken seriously by the other big allied 
countries.123Italy’s engagements in Euro-Atlantic and international institutions, combined 
with its good relationship with the United States, are Italy’s qualifications to act at eye 
level with the other big European states.124 Italy has—in comparison with the United 
Kingdom and France—no global ambitions. Italy’s “primary security interests are 
regional. Italy has a strong interest in avoiding insecurity spillovers from troubled 
neighboring regions.”125 Migration, for example, is such a problem.126 
C. STRATEGIC CULTURE AND MILITARY DOCTRINE 
Britain’s strategic culture is dominated by its special relationship with the United 
States. Britain emphasizes NATO, and not the EU, though its posture was amended 
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125Ibid. 
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Osvaldo Croci, “Italian Security Policy after the Cold War,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies (2003, vol. 
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somewhat under the Blair cabinet in 1998. For France, “the lessons of the colonial and 
decolonization periods are still relevant today”127 and “France is without doubt one of the 
European countries that put the most emphasis on military force in its international 
policy.”128 Irondelle and Besancenot describe the French security culture as “based on 
the sacrosanct principle of autonomous decision-making and independent defence 
capabilities. … French security culture gives priority to military and diplomatic responses 
over civilian and preventive responses.”129 Such policy also derives from the bitter 
experience with allies in two world wars and the perception that the Anglo Saxon powers 
are unreliable in a true crisis.  
Germany’s strategic culture, since unification, has subordinated military means to 
other aspects of statecraft. The legacy of the world wars led to a general skepticism about 
the use of military power far from Germany’s borders, and soldiers have had less say in 
policy than in other western democracies. Up to the end of the Cold War, deployments 
beyond central Europe were not an option for West-German forces. After the nation’s 
reunification, Germany’s 500,000 strong forward defense oriented air and land forces 
were reduced and reorganized with an ever tighter budget and ever more missions outside 
of central Europe. Today, Germany’s forces symbolize a tool of foreign-policy for crisis 
management in a multinational context. Germany’s defense-planning guidelines 
explicitly mention the need for pooling and sharing.130 As with France and the UK, 
10,000 soldiers can be earmarked at the same time for international conflict 
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nineteenth century … had a lasting, if limited, impact … on French strategic thinking.” Étienne de Durand, 
“France,” in Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney, eds., Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, 
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prevention.131 Despite that transformation, the European Union’s potentially most 
powerful state does not act like France or the United Kingdom in matters of statecraft and 
arms. Germany’s security culture is characterized by “multilateralism, emphasis on soft 
power, and pursuit of policy goals by civilian means.”132 Germany’s security culture is 
“strongly institutionalized at home and abroad.”133 “Europeanization has become the 
preferred strategy to overcome domestication in Germany’s security policy, but absolute 
limits – as defined by the Bundestag and the Federal Constitutional Court – are clearly 
identifiable.”134 Thus, Germany is not likely to act alone in the likely cases in which 
other western allies are enjoined to act, civilian instruments are emphasized, and military 
forces are seen by makers of policy as a last resort. From a German perspective, “security 
policy should be part of a civilized discourse that fosters democracy, human rights, and 
the rule of law.”135 Having the German threat perception in mind and considering the 
abuse of soldiers and by soldiers in the III. Reich, it is comprehensible that Germany’s 
populace is very reticent to use its forces abroad, and that this position differs from the 
French and British strategic cultures. 
Mark Gilbert gives a convincing view of Italy’s interests and strategic culture.136 
In his view, Italy is a second-rank power that “picked its side in the Cold War conflict 
and stuck to it.”137 As he observes, “Italy did not take a high profile on the international 
stage.”138 Italy shows no ambitions or means to be a leading power in Europe, such as 
France or the United Kingdom. As with Germany, Italy’s World War II experiences still 
exert a decisive influence on Italy’s strategic culture. The Italian constitution, for 
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example, “rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples 
and as a means for the settlement of international disputes.”139 The same article of Italy’s 
constitution states that “Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other states, to the 
limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and 
justice among the Nations. Italy promotes and encourages international organisations 
furthering such ends.”140 In accordance with this constitution, Italy has been and remains 
an active promoter of closer European integration and the construction of a supranational 
European Union.141 
As a cofounder of NATO, Italy has been and remains a close ally to the United 
States and a reliable member of the Alliance that regularly participates in crisis-response 
operations.142 The level of military personnel provided for deployments has been 
comparable to that of Germany, but only half as high as that of the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, or Sweden.143 
Luigi Caligaris wrote in 1983 that “public and political keenness about defence 
issues seemed to evaporate when the economic crisis was brought in front of the Italian 
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audience, in dramatic terms.”144 Nearly thirty years later, this statement seems to remain 
true. Military issues are still not at the top of Italy’s agenda and receive “little public 
attention or systematic discussion in Italy, and the lack of a coherent, articulated national 
security policy made defence planning unusually vulnerable to the vicissitudes of 
domestic politics.”145 Italy’s defense spending is comparatively low, and Italy’s military 
strength is therefore limited.146 Given the country’s enormous public deficits, it is not 
likely that Italy’s military expenditures will increase in the future. Therefore, Italy will 
rely heavily on further European military integration. 
D. POLITICAL DECISION MAKING AND PUBLIC OPINION 
As Jan Budge has noted, “The working British constitution … is ruthlessly 
simple: a government supported by the majority party in the House of Commons can do 
anything.”147 The constitution of the Fifth Republic gives the French president has nearly 
unlimited authority over his forces. The political decision-making process in Berlin 
makes cooperation with Germany comparatively difficult. The authority over German 
forces is held by the German parliament and the parliamentary decision-making process 
for military deployments is considered by other states to be untrustworthy, or at least 
unpredictable. 
The EU member states are liberal democracies in which mass public opinion 
functions as a limiting factor. Policymakers tend not to decide against an overwhelming 
public consensus.148 According to Thomas Risse-Kappen, “The factors that shape 
political decisions go far beyond the world of defence. Similarly, the political will to 
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sustain a deployment cannot be precisely measured, and can easily evaporate.”149 In 
democracies, a lack of public support can easily become the weakest link in a state’s 
freedom of action. Public perceptions of the military in the four big European states are 
clearly different. “When the British ‘Tommy’ Went to War, Public Opinion Followed” is 
the title of an article published in 2005.150 That is similar to the French public’s view but 
different from the German or Italian public’s view.151 Germany’s populace is very risk 
averse and opposes most out-of-area deployments. Germany seems to be relatively weak 
in this regard. The casualty numbers seen in the United States, Canada and Great Britain 
would probably not be accepted by the German public.  
E. NATIONAL BEHAVIOR TOWARD COOPERATION 
Since the end of the Cold War, nations have more and more pooled their forces on 
the national level by putting similar troops and weapon systems together in the same 
location to ease logistics, reduce administrative overhead, pool expertise and thus reduce 
the overall costs. Critical capabilities and force enablers have been centralized at the joint 
level and are shared by all services of national military forces in order to avoid costly 
duplication and allow for a centralized management of critical capabilities. In the light of 
the financial crisis in Europe and the resulting austerity measures in most member states 
of the EU, this process has gained attractiveness at the international level. 
Great Britain’s December 2010 Green Book152 makes some clear statements in 
connection with the intentions and the limits of the UK’s military cooperation. The 
government of the UK states that it will use pooling and sharing as long as its freedom of 
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action is not jeopardized. The UK does not exclude multilateral solutions, but generally 
favors bilateral solutions with partner states inside and outside the EU, particularly those 
whose defense and security postures are similar to its own. Such arrangements are 
considered potentially more straightforward and more fruitful than complex multilateral 
agreements, which can be hampered by contractual and political issues and which suffer 
from over-complexity. Overall, the British position on European defense cooperation is 
relatively skeptical.  
[The] possession of a national security capability, including any 
advantages, is not sufficient in itself. The UK also requires freedom of 
action: the ability to determine its internal and external affairs and act in 
the country’s interests free from intervention by other states or entities, in 
accordance with EU and international law. In particular, this includes 
being able to conduct combat operations at a time and place of our 
choosing. This freedom is the essence of national sovereignty.153 
France would find it is difficult to rely on the military forces and arms of other 
states without a guarantee that those capabilities would be available to France to pursue 
its priorities in national security policy, including French military operations abroad. In 
principle, France would like “to preserve the full spectrum of its capabilities, even for 
high-intensity warfare and large scale operations. But … France is definitely punching 
above its weight.”154 This is one of the reasons why France changed its behavior to more 
“emphasis on multilateral rather than unilateral options, and on civilian rather than 
military instruments.”155 The United Kingdom is the only other state in the European 
Union that shares a similar security culture. This is why France has recently deepened its 
bilateral military relationship with the United Kingdom.  
Outside the European Union, France cooperates mostly with former French 
colonies in Africa. Beyond training and equipment programs and military assistance 
agreements, France has a foot in Africa with prepositioned forces on permanent bases at 
                                                 
153British Ministry of Defence, “Equipment, Support, and Technology for UK Defence and Security: 
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154Bastien Irondelle and Sophie Besancenot, “France:A Departure from Exceptionalism,” 37. 
155Ibid., 39. 
 59 
strategic sites.156France uses the realm of security very actively for commercial policy. 
France has important military–industrial capacities that are only partly interwoven with 
those of other European countries. Most of France’s military equipment is produced 
domestically.157 When French economic interests are at stake—above all in the realm of 
armaments—France acts very self-confidently and calculatingly. Cooperation is often 
tied to the delivery of arms.158For France, its own defense industry is an important part of 
its strength, and France is loath to sacrifice this highly valued asset on the altar of 
European defense.159 
“If France cannot rely exclusively on national sources, the preferred form of 
compromise is more extensive bilateral and multilateral cooperation in specific arms 
projects with European partners.”160Bilateral arrangements are more common than pan-
European approaches. For France, the fact that the United Kingdom will not commit itself 
to cooperate more profoundly in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
is a comfortable situation that allows Paris to rely on the Franco-German leadership 
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tandem inside the European Union. At the same time, the capability of France’s strategic 
culture with that of Britain allows France to strengthen its military cooperation with the 
United Kingdom. In this respect, the 2011 intervention in Libya—conducted with the 
political leadership of Britain and France—was a perfect example of how this 
cooperation can be fruitful, despite the fact that a deployment on an EU basis was not 
possible. 
In the phase of European military cooperation prior to 1989, Germany was a 
motivating force but not a leader. After German unification in 1990 this situation changed 
slowly but steadily and, owing to its economic strength, Germany was pushed by events 
into a leadership role. A telling statement sums up the issue: “leadership in economic 
quasi hegemonic German role is not something Germany in the sense of the majority of 
the Germans were looking for or wanted, quite the reverse, they would be quite happy to 
get on with their business on being a greater Switzerland.”161 The statement of German 
Defense Policy Guidelines of May 27, 2011 mentions “partnership and cooperation as 
part of multinational integration and global security cooperation in the context of modern 
defence diplomacy”162 explicitly as one task of the Bundeswehr. These guidelines 
particularly focus on intra-European coordination. Overall, Germany does not trust too 
much in pooling and sharing and wants to focus on a few new projects rather than a lot of 
small ones.163 However, in Germany—despite verbally calling for a stronger European 
Union all the time—the defense cutbacks in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007 did 
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not unfold with close coordination in an allied or EU framework. As in Britain, most of 
the forces and arms remain national, although to a lesser and sometimes very thin extent. 
Italy does not belong at the core of military cooperation, and there is no European 
partner that can be seen as a primary or favored partner for bilateral cooperation. Mölling 
and Brune cluster Italy together with the United Kingdom and others164 in a group of 
undecided states that have “an ambiguous stance regarding closer defense cooperation 
within the EU. They may favor e.g., the NATO framework or bilateral formats,”165 but 
for Italy, up to now, the only bilateral agreement with a pooling character is the Franco-
Italian Brigade created in 2010. “Italy, by instinct, is definitely a supporter of a Europe-
centered NATO”166 and “creating synergy between NATO and EU is important for Italy 
also because this has potential to reduce, at least partially, the pressure on its stretched 
military budget.”167 Italy spends a huge percentage of its defense budget on personnel,168 
but at the same time Italy buys weapons on the European and U.S. markets. Italy, for 
example, is engaged in the Eurofighter and the Joint Strike Fighter program and also 
relies regularly on acquisitions of U.S. weapons. However, due to austerity measures, 
Italy has had to cut back its ambitions.169 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Military cooperation among twenty-six sovereign states170 with different interests, 
to say nothing of divergent sizes and strengths, poses numerous challenges of policy and 
practice. Up to now, many cost-saving measures have taken place on a national level. For 
example, the structural changes in Germany and Great Britain’s military forces 
implemented in the wake of the world banking crisis of 2010 and 2011 did not reflect 
European coordination or cooperation. Both states reduced the volume of their armed 
forces considerably, but both states, nonetheless, intend to acquire and maintain the full 
range of capabilities nationally even while their forces are in combat. If every EU nation 
continues to spend its money without coordinating with allies or partners—or, worse, 
unilaterally cuts its military spending as a short-term response to the financial crisis 
improvements in capability are not likely. Indeed, European security could suffer, 
perhaps significantly. However, the behavior of the small contributors does not really 
have an important effect on the overall measure of power. What is more important is how 
the biggest states spend on defense; and unilateral behavior and mistrust continue.171 
The four largest EU countries have different priorities and interests. These 
differences stand out in the realm of strategic culture, the role of the military, regional 
interests, behavior towards the United States, and approaches to the European Union and 
NATO. In the domain of defense, the United Kingdom and France are not likely to rely 
on other EU nations, and especially not on Germany. Britain’s special relationship with 
the United States appears likely to continue; and “Britain’s holding back from Europe is a 
major factor standing in the way of the EU emerging as a powerful actor.”172 However, 
for pooling and sharing, different interests are not the biggest obstacles, even if they are 
                                                 
170Denmark does not take part in the Common Security and Defence Policy. 
171At the 2012 Munich Security Conference, the German Minister of Defense, Thomas de Maizière, 
found clear words for the “passing the buck” mentality in Europe with regard to pooling and sharing: 
“Some people think that they get a capability for free, that they do not have. And others think that they get 
money from others for a capability that they already have. Both are illusions.” Thomas de Maizière, 
German Minister of Defense, Statement at the 48. Munich Security Conference. 
172John Van Oudenaren. “The United Kingdom: Old Dilemmas and New Realities” in Ronald 
Tiersky and John Van Oudenaren, eds., European Foreign Policies: Does Europe Still Matter? 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 207. 
 63 
well-established and firm. Seeming unreliability and persistent distrust are the major 
problems that derive from the “short-term, emotional, reactive definition of national 
interest reacting on the latest opinion poll the latest local election, the media pressure.”173 
                                                 
173Timothy G. Ash, Speech at the Munich Security Conference 2012. 
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V. INSTITUTION-BASED POOLING AND SHARING 
The international institutions dealing with European security face many 
challenges. One challenge for the EU is to promote and further integrate European 
military capabilities. Twenty-one of the twenty-eight NATO member states are also 
members of the EU. From its foundation, NATO successes in military cooperation have 
been more obvious than those of the EU granted that the latter only recently has 
undertaken a security and defense role. This chapter focuses on the forces that promote 
and drive the pooling and sharing of forces and arms. After explaining a theoretical 
framework of how to implement pooling and sharing in the EU, the balance of the 
chapter will explore the role of NATO and the United States in promoting 
pooling and sharing of military capabilities in Europe. The findings of this analysis may 
throw light on the prospects for success of pooling and sharing and contribute to the 
ongoing discussion about pooling and sharing on both sides of the Atlantic.174 
A. THE RELATION BETWEEN NATO AND EU 
How far are institutions such as EU or NATO able to support closer cooperation 
between their member states and what precedents might serve as a guide for the further 
development of pooling and sharing? Josef Colomer observes correctly that 
institutions form a necessary framework for human interaction and the 
peaceful solution of social conflicts, which at the same time attempts to 
promote social benefits. In a more theoretical manner, institutions may be 
conceived of as a means of overcoming co-ordination and co-operation 
problems in collective action for the provision of public goods and for 
achieving agreement among individuals with varied preferences and 
interests.175 
Thus, permanent organizations like NATO and the EU have decisive functions in 
the realm of European security and they create much more than transparency about 
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national policies. Memberships in such alliances are of a long-term nature, and they 
facilitate short-term decisions about actual problems and disputes.176 
Through all its attempts at military integration, the EU has had to consider the 
existing military alliance in the form of NATO, because twenty-one of the twenty-seven 
member states are also in NATO, and the overlap of memberships in NATO and the EU 
makes it difficult to differentiate between us and others. The territorial defense of the 
European Allies remains the responsibility of NATO. For the EU, NATO is like an elder 
brother, and it is not always clear whether he helps or hampers stronger military 
cooperation in daily business.177 
Figure 14 displays the shares of defense spending in NATO and the European 
Union.  
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Figure 14.   Comparison of Defense Spending in NATO and the EU178 
As seen in the leftmost pie chart, the biggest share is provided by the United 
States. The second largest pie chart consists of states that are both NATO members and 
part of the EU. Nearly three quarters of this pie are provided by only four of the twenty-
one countries.179 European states that are part of either NATO or the EU, but not both, 
provide a proportionately smaller part of the burden. Figure 14 shows that if states that 
take part in both organizations (together with the United States) come together for 
common solutions, most of the capabilities are covered. 
Institutions play a major role in pooling and sharing, but that does not mean that 
pooling and sharing are limited to membership in special institutions. The South Eastern 
European Brigade (SEEBRIG), for example, involves states that are neither part of the 
                                                 
178Figure 14 is based on data of the European Defence Agency (EDA) “EU-U.S. Defence Data 2010,” 
(January 2012), http://eda.europa.eu/publications/12–01–12/EU-U.S._Defence_Data_2010, and “National 
Defence Data 2010,” (March 2012). http://eda.europa.eu/publications/12–03–07/National_Defence-
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EU nor members of NATO.180 The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) does not 
exclude NATO-only or EU-only countries.181 Both examples show that non-participation 
in an institution does not have to be a disqualifier for successful defense cooperation. —
On the contrary, regional pooling and sharing with a few neighboring states could 
facilitate further integration and could be a good first step for new members in 
organizations. 
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S AMBITIONS 
The integration of European defense played a role throughout the second half of 
the 20th century.182 This integration process went through several generally unsuccessful 
attempts to coordinate European defense capacities.183 A major milestone was the 
British–French Saint Malo declaration of 1998 that called for a security and defense role 
for the EU on the international stage, founded on its capacities for autonomous action and 
backed up by the availability of military forces to react in crises. Prior to this declaration, 
the positions of France and the UK had been incompatible for about fifty years. 
Saint Malo removed this blockade and unleashed a widespread debate about security 
issues.184 
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In the EU, pooling and sharing have been an issue since the birth of the ESDP.185 
Pooling and sharing were not at the top of the political agendas of the EU states, and 
pooling and sharing under the auspices of the EU are the exception rather than the rule. 
While the EU, as a supranational organization, ties its member states closely in many 
policy areas, security and defense policy remains an intergovernmental issue, and the EU 
cannot force its member states to cooperate in this arena. While the relative power of the 
EU in security and defense issues has grown in the last decade or so, it is still very 
limited. In principle, national security remains the sole responsibility of each member 
state, and the states retain the ultimate decision-making authority and veto power. The 
EU coordinates member states’ policies or implements supplemental common policies as 
long as they are not covered elsewhere. Member states are sovereign in decisions 
concerning their military forces, and the EU has no legal instruments to enforce security-
related decisions that would limit national sovereignty.186 So far, the only common and 
wide-reaching military cooperation on the EU level regarding capabilities development 
has concerned the European Battle Groups. 
C. NATO AND SMART DEFENCE 
NATO is still the foundation of European defense. As a permanent and integrated 
alliance with twenty-eight members and more than 60 years’ experience in security 
cooperation, NATO “offers its members incentives and opportunities to affect decisions 
concerning costs and benefits that are not present in more traditional forms of 
alliance.”187After World War II, the “imminence of the communist peril”188 was a 
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common threat that led to the formation of NATO and that decisively encouraged 
cooperation in NATO. This multilateral approach to international relations in Europe was 
easy to pursue because external security was to a great extent guaranteed by the United 
States. According to Helga Welsh in her misquote of Lord Ismay, “NATO’s goal was 
said to be to keep Russia out, the United States in, and Germany down.”189 As Wallace 
Thies has observed, “The Americans wanted an alliance that would reassure, but also 
inspire, the Europeans to do more; the Europeans wanted an alliance that would commit 
the Americans to do most of the work.”190 As a result, NATO was formed as an 
“information-gathering machine”191 and “an extensive planning and supervisory 
apparatus … necessary to ensure that each member contributed … ‘the kind of forces and 
the production of weapons for which it is best suited and which will best fit into a pattern 
of integrated defense.’”192 
Military integration—namely, pooling the members’ armed forces within a 
NATO-wide framework of unified military commands—was itself an 
attempt to close the gap between demands and resources by eliminating 
duplication and overlap, thereby allowing efficiencies and economies of 
scale that would make possible a robust collective effort at a manageable 
cost.193 
In principle, all NATO members have the same rights. However, as Wallace Thies 
has written, “During the alliance’s formative years, it was the Americans who took the 
lead in drawing up detailed plans for NATO, the-organization.”194 
Since 2010, NATO tried under the logo of “smart defence” to renew the effort to 
provide more security for less money as the prospect of demobilization from the post 11 
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September decade of war took hold. “Smart defence is a concept that encourages allies to 
cooperate in developing, acquiring, and maintaining military capabilities to meet current 
security problems in accordance with the new NATO strategic concept. That means 
pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts 
better.”195NATO sees smart defence as a means to get the best output for scarce 
resources, and NATO sees prioritization, specialization, and cooperation as the 
constituents of smart defence. For the purposes of smart defence, NATO wants the 
nations  
to give priority to those capabilities which NATO needs most, specialize 
in what they do best, and look for multinational solutions to shared 
problems. NATO can act as intermediary, helping the nations to establish 
what they can do together at lower cost, more efficiently and with less 
risk.196 
NATO is aware that unilateral national decisions to abandon capabilities without 
meeting NATO’s capability requirements involve the risk of new capability gaps and 
may force others to maintain those capabilities.197 “Such specialization ‘by default’ is the 
inevitable result of uncoordinated budget cuts.”198 NATO wants to “encourage 
specialization ‘by design’ so that members concentrate on their national strengths and 
agree to coordinate planned defense budget cuts”199 Some existing programs were co-
opted under Smart Defence but relatively few new approaches arose.200 Up to now, 
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NATO’s Smart Defence approach has not been able to encourage NATO nations to 
fundamentally rethink their national approaches. 
D. NATO AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
In the cold war years the ideal was standardization, that is, the policy that 
promoted commonly procured, maintained, and operated capabilities as the kind of 
cooperation that best expresses the working together of all members, because such 
capabilities, such as NATO AWACS or NATO’s integrated command structure, mean 
one really common asset for all, with investments by all, access by all, and useable by all. 
AWACS “is the alliance’s largest collaborative project and is an example of what NATO 
member countries, in this case eighteen nations, can achieve by pooling resources and 
working together in a truly multinational environment.”201 
When in the 1970s air defenses had to spot extremely low-flying aircraft,202 the 
ability to look down with airborne radar seemed to be the solution. Boeing’s approach, 
with adapted civil aircraft, was built on international integration and interwoven 
dependencies. In contrast, the United Kingdom first tried to build its own aircraft. This 
British approach, strongly relying on national industry and trying to realize such a system 
independently, revealed its limitations and misspent $1.3 billion. Eventually, Boeing’s 




                                                 
201This project is truly multinational. The member nations are Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition to the aircraft, the program 
included the upgrade of 40 interoperable NATO ground-based radar sites, stretching from northern Norway 
to eastern Turkey. In addition to the main operating base in Germany, forward operating sites exist in 
Konya in Turkey, Aktion in Greece, Trapani in Italy, and in Oerland, Norway. NATO homepage, 
“AWACS: NATO’s ‘Eye In The Sky’,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics-
_48904.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 03/18/2012. 
202During the 1960s, it became clear that military aircraft could no longer fly high enough to avoid 
surface-to-air missiles. To survive in an increasingly lethal air defense environment, aircraft were forced 
down to near tree-top levels and were difficult to detect by ground based radar. All nations had to react to 
this new situation. 
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together.203 At the end of the 1970s, NATO’s Defence Planning Committee approved the 
joint acquisition of eighteen alliance-owned airborne early warning systems that were 
delivered between 1982 and 1985. 
However, the details of the AWACS program show that even major and long-
lasting projects do not work without problems or the pursuit of national arrangements. 
First, not all allies place their trust in the common NATO solution. In addition to their 
participation in NATO’s common AWACS, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
France204 have built up and operate their own AWACS assets.205Second, the AWACS 
example has shown that in this project—despite all optimistic expectations—the 
relatively large German contribution makes a sustainable use of AWACS impossible 
without German participation. Germany’s share of nearly one third of AWACS, however 
has led to several problems with AWACS deployments since such missions have 
ventured outside of central Europe. Such examples include when the United States 
wanted to have AWACS support for the war on Iraq in 1991 as well as 2003,206 when 
 
 
                                                 
203For details, see Theodore H. Moran, “The Globalization of America’s Defense Industries: 
Managing the Threat of Foreign Dependence,” International Security (summer 1990, vol. 15. no. 1), 67. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538982, accessed 03/06/2012. 
204With a fleet of seven E-3D aircraft the United Kingdom contributes directly to the NATO Airborne 
Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF). France maintains an observer role and ensures that its E-
3Fs remain interoperable with the NAEW&C and U.S. fleets. NATO homepage, AWACS: NATO’s ‘Eye 
In The Sky’. 
205The Headquarters of AWACS is co-located with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and exercises operational control over the NE-3A Component based in 
Germany that operates the 17 NATO-owned NE-3A aircraft. These components are manned by 
international crews from 16 nations. The E-3D component based in the United Kingdom operates seven 
Boeing E-3D aircraft. This component is manned by the United Kingdom and is also under the operational 
control of the common headquarters. 
206“In 2003, for example, the U.S. wanted to use AWACS for the invasion of Iraq but several 
countries were hesitant to give the authorization. The German government, which had initially refused to 
allow its crew to fly the AWACS, finally relented – explaining that the operation was in order because it 
was taking place on the Turkish border and would therefore serve to protect the Alliance.” Jean-Pierre, 
Maulny, Fabio, Liberti and Gerrard Quille, “Pooling of EU Member States Assets in the Implementation of 
ESDP” European Parliamentary Studies (Brussels: European Parliament, 2008 ) 9, http://isis-europe.eu/si-
tes/default/files/publications-downloads/2008_artrel_142_08–02epstudy-pooling.pdf, accessed 03/22/2012. 
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NATO tried to integrate AWACS in Afghanistan,207 and when AWACS was needed for 
Libya in 2011.208 Thus, the use of AWACS in Afghanistan or for the operations in Libya 
was either challenging the system or was to some extent not possible. The role of policy 
and politics in the use of weapons reveals that military integration and shared weapons 
cannot in and of itself provide a magic solution, especially when sovereignty and national 
interest diverge in an error of limited conflict that is more political.  
E. ALLIANCE GROUND SURVEILLANCE 
How difficult, complex, and long-lasting the pursuit of pooled or shared solutions 
can be is best demonstrated by NATO’s plan to acquire an Alliance Ground Surveillance 
(AGS) system. This project barely crossed the finish line. When this system becomes 
operable in 2015–2017, a more than twenty-two-year marathon that began with the first 
planning meetings in 1992 will be over. Thirteen nations209 will contribute to the system. 
They will acquire five unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and command-and-control base 
stations. Afterwards NATO will operate and maintain the system on behalf of all twenty-
eight NATO members. “The decision to engage NATO common funding for 
infrastructure, satellite communications, operations, and support paves the way for 
awarding the AGS acquisition contract by thirteen allies.”210 The enormous time span 
                                                 
207In winter 2009, an AWACS component was deployed for 3 months in support of the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. With reference to AWACS in Afghanistan 
one statement was reported by Spiegel online international: “Germany’s stance has been criticized at 
NATO headquarters. ‘It’s ridiculous,’ said one source who declined to be named. ‘Officially, the Germans 
are demanding a greater division of labor on an international level and then they put the brakes on the first 
multinational project.’” Spiegel international (December 13, 2010), “AWACS for Afghanistan: Germany 
may Refuse NATO Request for Help,” http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,73427-
9,00.html, accessed 03/21/2012. 
208After long discussion and with some reluctance Germany “approved a plan to send AWACS 
surveillance planes to Afghanistan in order to free up NATO capacity for operations in Libya.” Spiegel 
International (March 23, 2011), “Germany’s Libya Contribution: Merkel Cabinet Approves AWACS for 
Afghanistan,” http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,752709,00.html, accessed 03/21/2012. 
209Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United States take part. This system will give commanders a 
comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. NATO’s operation to protect civilians in Libya 
showed how important such a capability is. For details on this system see NATO homepage “Alliance 




and the fact that additional agreements “make the United Kingdom Sentinel system and 
the future French Heron TP system available as national contributions-in-kind, partly 
replacing financial contributions from those two allies”211 give an idea of how protracted 
and complex such negotiations tend to be. 
F. COMMON FUNDING AS INCENTIVE 
It is not important in all areas to share capabilities or assets, and it is much easier 
to share costs, because money is the easiest means to set incentives. Common funding has 
the character of outsourcing, and it is an incentive that can really change government 
behavior. However, it is decisive but difficult to set the right incentives, as the example of 
NATO’s common funding of infrastructure proves. “One reason why NATO members 
built so many large air bases … rather than buying aircraft and support equipment that 
could operate from dispersed field locations is that the latter had to be paid for out of 
national budgets whereas the NATO infrastructure program paid for main operating 
bases.”212 In this case common funding worked as an incentive, but brought negative side 
effects, such as suppression or neglect of other procurements. Wallace Thies argues that  
the greater the degree of integration achieved, the more energetic the 
efforts by democratic governments to shift some of the defense burden to 
allies in order to gain for themselves the economies envisioned at the time 
the decision to pool resources was made.213 
One study predicts that lower defense spending, industrial interests and the 
multiplication of transnational companies and cooperative programs will overcome the 
resistance to major capability pooling in the next few years.214 This study also recognizes 
that budgetary aspects of pooling are important.  
The “ATHENA mechanism,” established in 2004 for common funding of EU 
operations, covers only ten percent of an operation’s costs while 90 percent has to be paid 
                                                 
211NATO homepage, “Press Factsheet: Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS),” http://www.nato.int/-
nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_02/20120203_120203-ags.pdf, accessed 03/22/2012. 
212Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO, 11. 
213Ibid., 17. 
214Jean-Pierre, Maulny, Fabio, Liberti and Gerrard Quille, “Pooling of EU Member States Assets in 
the Implementation of ESDP,” 16. 
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by the nations conducting the operation. At the moment, some nations, especially those 
with lower economic strength, have relevant military assets but are not willing or not able 
to provide them for crisis management operations, because they cannot afford the 
consequent costs. If a common funding mechanism for troops was established, it might 
overcome this reluctant behavior and, because of the cost structures, all the EU nations 
would be better off. The idea of providing funding for troop contributions is the same 
mechanism that is used by the United Nations, and it makes it more practical for smaller 
countries to participate with their own contributions. Pooling money is much easier 
method of cooperation than pooling assets or troops. 
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VI. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
The fate of reform of arms and weapons in the EU concerns North America to 
which this study now turns. To what extent are pooling and sharing inside the EU 
influenced by the transatlantic relationship with the United States? There is a kind of 
ambiguity regarding how U.S. policy on security and defense may influence further 
European cooperation. Peace and security in European continue to concern the United 
States and vice versa, despite all suggestions to the contrary. The United States and its 
military capabilities are so dominant in NATO that it is not possible to exclude them from 
any analysis of defense reform. Figure 15 illustrates the different military ambitions of 
specific EU member states in comparison with those of the United States. The positions 
of the spheres are determined by the relative defense spending as a percentage of GDP 
and percentage of deployed troops. The size of the sphere illustrates absolute defense 
spending. Despite the differences among the European countries, it can be clearly seen 
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Figure 15.   European Union – United States Comparison of Military Ambitions 2010215 
The central European democracies are not the only ones that rely primarily on a 
strong NATO partnership with the United States, and not on the defense capabilities of 
other European states.216 Perhaps Joschka Fischer said it best, when he suggested a 
decade ago as German foreign minister that, “I don’t believe Europe will ever be 
militarily strong enough to look after its security alone.”217 
The U.S. position on CSDP is ambivalent. On one hand, the United States 
government wishes for a more capable and militarily engaged Europe. On the other hand, 
                                                 
215The size of spheres corresponds to the sum of defense spending 2010. Figure 15 is based on data of 
the European Defence Agency (EDA), “EU-U.S. Defence Data 2010,” (January 2012), 
http://eda.europa.eu/publications/12–01–12/EU-U.S._Defence_Data_2010 and “National Defence Data 
2010,” (March 2012), http://eda.europa.eu/publications/12–03–07/National_Defence_Data_2010. The 
deployment data of Latvia were provided by the Ministry of Defense of Latvia in April 2012. 
216Examples are Bulgaria and Poland but also Denmark and Italy. 
217Joschka Fischer, quoted in “We’re not children!” The Economist (May 17, 2003), 45. 
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the United States government in practice still primarily addresses individual nations when 
it comes to security issues, and Washington, quite rightly, relies on NATO, and not the 
EU, as the institution to support transatlantic security cooperation, since the nation is not 
a member of the latter organization. Many European states emphasize and try to foster 
their own (special) relationships with the powerful United States, which dominates the 
partnership. For example, for most European states, engagement in the Afghanistan 
mission fulfills more “the political aim of showing solidarity with the United States”218 
than national interest in a parochial sense.219 
For the United States, this situation is comfortable because as long as the 
European Union cannot speak with one voice and the bilateral relationships are strong, 
there will always be some European partners who share American positions, buy U.S. 
weapons systems, and/or contribute troops for combined operations. It might be better to 
get the full support from half of the EU nations than no support from the European Union 
because, for example, the EU countries cannot reach consensus.220 On the other hand, a 
diverse and divided European Union will be not as capable as a European Union that 
deeply cooperates in the realm of defense. These circumstances must also be taken into 
account in all planning and policy regarding military pooling and sharing inside the EU. 
                                                 
218Harald Kujat quoted in “German General Says NATO Mission Has ‘Failed’,” (October 7, 2011), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,790539,00.html, accessed 05/02/2012. 
219The statement of the then France’s ambassador to Afghanistan illustrates how the United States 
policy directly and indirectly influences European decisions in security affairs: “Too rapid a departure 
[from Afghanistan] would be out of the question, given that our presence in the eyes of our allies, 
especially the Americans and the British, demonstrates our renewed commitment to the Atlantic alliance 
and our status as a pillar of a European defense system still under development. Had it not been for this, 
military cooperation agreements would never have been signed with Britain in November 2010.”Jean 
d’Amécourt, “Europe in Afghanistan,” International Herald Tribune, July 2, 2011. 
220If the military capacities of the EU member states had been commonly shared and strongly 
interwoven, the 2003 European dispute over participation in Iraq would have probably led to no European 
participation at all. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The defense interest trilemma shows that it is not possible to emphasize security, 
sovereignty, and resource efficiency simultaneously, but institutions such as NATO and 
the EU are able to mediate between different national positions. In this realm, pooling 
and sharing are not a silver bullet and they “will never compensate for inadequate 
defence budgets: when average spending in Europe, as percentage of GDP, drops by half 
– as it has over the past two decades – militaries will inevitably suffer. The EU member-
states will almost certainly do ‘less with less’ rather than ‘more with less’”221 unless the 
major contributors start a rethinking with a European perspective rather than national 
views. The sovereignty of the European Union states is already limited and most of the 
threats cannot be countered with national capabilities. 
Pooling and sharing should not be done just anywhere and accidently but 
comprehensively and in a controlled and purposeful manner. European defense 
capabilities have to be seen in perspective. For a new approach to be effective, Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, and Italy must sing from the same sheet of music and in 
harmony. Times of austerity have closed up the national differences and specifics but the 
military ambitions, national interests and strategic cultures are far away from uniform. 
The European Union needs a stronger emphasis on security, in view of the United 
States’ support for closer European cooperation. The United States has a decisive role in 
the European Union’s further military integration. As long as the United States cultivates 
and emphasizes bilateral relationships in the domain of defense policy and does not 
directly focus on the EU, it is unlikely that the four large and decisive EU members will 
act in concert.  
Membership in an institution simplifies military cooperation, but it is not a 
fundamental requirement. Moreover, membership or non-membership in NATO and/or 
EU is not dispositive for pooling and sharing. However, simply looking at the size of the 
                                                 
221Tomas Valasek, “EU Ministers tackle Defence Austerity” Centre for European Reform (June 1, 
2011), http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2011/06, accessed 03/22/2012. 
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defense budget spheres shows that European defense without NATO is not an option. 
NATO is adequately open to combining the different positions. This analysis has shown 
that NATO’s multinational approaches were successful and able to outclass national 
solutions, although sometimes persistence and the patience of Job is needed. 
For commonly shared high-value assets like NATO AWACS, it would be too 
costly to produce such redundancies. In such cases, where many or all of the member 
states share capabilities, a nation still should have the right of not participating in a 
special deployment, but no single nation should have such big a share that it is able to 
block the whole capability by its abstention. Pooling is not as much subject to 
dependencies as sharing, and the effects on efficiency are smaller. The ability to act 
unilaterally with military force on a national basis is limited de facto to a few bigger 
member states and a few special scenarios. 
Role-shared capabilities must not be understood as a potential trump card that can 
be played to outwit another nation. The states have to play together as one team. Every 
nation is free to decide to play on the team or not. However, this cannot be a decision that 
switches on a day-to-day basis. If a nation decides to be part of the team and regularly 
trains with the team, than it is not acceptable to take oneself out shortly before the game.  
Pooling and sharing saves money only when it is established right from the 
beginning of a life cycle of military assets and involves at least the major European 
defense spenders, which are United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy and a few 
other nations. The life cycle starts with research and development, a budget area that is 
relatively concentrated in Europe, limited to a few European states. More than half of the 
overall European defense budget is spend on personnel, and the average costs for 
personnel are widespread between states. Therefore, all future solutions should consider 
these location factors and allocate resources in a way that it is best for all states aboard 
the European boat.  
Solutions will have to be more than a snapshot of the current political situation 
and they will have to be resistant to political crises and changes of national governments 
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and party politics.222 The real challenge for 2020 and 2030 is not the role of specific 
European states in the world, “the challenge for 2020 and 2030 is Europe’s role in the 
world.”223 Maybe then the world will be more accustomed to use the left hand than 
today. 
                                                 
222Such inconsistency is often the result of “the pursuit of self-interest by elites looking ahead to the 
next election.” Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO, 276. Political 
survival is ranked in first place “by elites whose ability to win and hold elective and appointive office 
depends in part on their ability to persuade and if need to outwit their counterparts in other NATO 
capitals.” Ibid., 8. 
223Timothy G. Ash, Speech at the Munich Security Conference 2012, http://www.security-
conference.de/?id=815, accessed 03/02/2012. 
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